Wealth and asset price effects on economic activity by Filippo Altissimo et al.
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES








Gabriel Sterne, Marc Stocker,
Mark Weth, Karl Whelan 
and Alpo WillmanIn 2005 all ECB 
publications 
will feature 




NO. 29 / JUNE 2005
This paper can be downloaded from 
the ECB’s website (http://www.ecb.int).
1      This is the joint work of a team composed of Filippo Altissimo (ECB), Evaggelia Georgiou (Bank of Greece),
Teresa Sastre (Banco de España), Maria Teresa Valderrama (Österreichische Nationalbank),
Gabriel Sterne (Bank of England), Marc Stocker (ECB), Mark Weth (Deutsche Bundesbank), 









Gabriel Sterne, Marc Stocker,
Mark Weth, Karl Whelan 
and Alpo Willman© European Central Bank, 2005
Address
Kaiserstrasse 29
60311 Frankfurt am Main
Germany
Postal address
Postfach 16 03 19
60066 Frankfurt am Main
Germany
Telephone




+49 69 1344 6000
Telex
411 144 ecb d
All rights reserved. Reproduction for
educational and non-commercial
purposes is permitted provided that
the source is acknowledged.
The views expressed in this paper do









2 WEALTH CHANNEL 4
2.1 A theoretical review 5
2.1.1 Implications of the lifetime
budget constraint 5
2.1.2 Implications of risk
aversion 7
2.1.3 Implications of income
uncertainty 8
2.1.4 Do marginal propensities to
consume out of different
wealth components differ? 8
2.1.4.1 Implications of market
imperfections, taxation and
diversified bequest motives 9
2.1.4.2 Implications of the
(un)predictability of asset
prices 9
2.1.4.3 Marginal propensities to
consume out of non-equity
financial wealth, equity
wealth and housing wealth 11
2.2 Some conclusions 12
3 HOUSEHOLD WEALTH:
A STATISTICAL REVIEW 13
3.1 Decomposition of household wealth
into financial and housing wealth 13
3.2 Decomposition of household
financial wealth to components 14
3.3 Equity wealth effect, income
distribution and demographics 15
4 ASSET PRICE EFFECTS VIA THE WEALTH
CHANNEL: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 18
4.1 Micro data evidence 18
4.2 The MPC out of wealth in some
calibrated theory-based models 19
4.3 Aggregate time series estimates of
MPC out of wealth 20
4.3.1 MPC out of wealth based




estimate of MPC out of
wealth: direct data-based
approach 21
4.3.2.1 Evidence based on
cross-country studies 21
4.3.2.2 Evidence based on
single-country studies 24
4.4 Overview and provisos to
established results 26
4.5 How significant are cross-country
differences in estimated MPC out of
wealth? 27
4.6 Conclusions 28
5 ASSET PRICES AND INVESTMENT 29
5.1 Equity prices and corporate
investment 29
5.2 Tobin’s Q or cost-of-capital
channel 30




1 Comparability of equity wealth
data across countries 37
2 The US evidence on wealth effects
on consumption 40
3 Balance sheet channel 45
REFERENCES 524
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 29
June 2005
1 INTRODUCTION
Do asset prices affect real activity? This
question has taken on a new importance in
recent years, as asset values first surged at the
end of 1990s and, thereafter, dramatically
retreated. The macroeconomic importance of
this phenomenon is illustrated by Figure 1,
which presents stock market capitalisation as a
percentage of GDP in some major
industrialised countries. From the 1970s to the
late 1990s this ratio rose six to eightfold in all
countries (except in Japan). However,
subsequently it fell markedly, and in 2002 it
had declined to around half of its late 1990s
peak. In 2003 the stock market capitalisation
ratio began to recover moderately. It is
therefore natural to ask how much of this
variation has been transmitted into economic
activity?
There are four channels through which stock
prices can be considered to affect activity:
(1) the wealth effect on consumption, (2) the
Tobin’s Q effect on investment, (3) the balance
sheet effect on private spending (via the credit
channel) and (4) the confidence effect on
private spending. The approach that we follow
Figure 1 Stock market capitalisation in
some large economies
(as a percentage of GDP)
in this report is that of partial equilibrium
rather than general equilibrium, because the
focus is on the transmission of asset price
effects on activity via these channels. Our aim
is to review the evidence contained in the
recent and fast growing literature. The main
text concentrates on the first two channels, as
distinguishing the balance sheet and
confidence effects from those transmitted via
the wealth and Tobin’s Q channel is, at least in
the macro data, very difficult. However,
balance sheet and confidence channels are
discussed in Appendix 3 of this report. Section
2 presents the theoretical background of the
wealth channel. A statistical review of the
wealth composition across countries is given in
Section 3. The empirical evidence on the
effects of wealth and its main components on
consumption is reviewed in Section 4. The
effect of asset prices on investment via Tobin’s
Q channel is reviewed in Section 5 and Section
6 concludes.
2 WEALTH CHANNEL
The wealth channel has sound theoretical
foundations. Consumers intertemporal utility
maximisation under a lifetime resource
constraint, states that current consumption is
proportional to total wealth,
(2.1)          
() []
Y mpc A mpc





       
 
where C is consumption, A is real non-human
wealth and H is real human wealth, i.e. the
present value of expected labour income (net of
taxes) Y. The proportionality coefficients mpc
measure the marginal propensity to consume
(MPC) out of wealth and income, respectively.
As, by definition, labour income and human
wealth are co-integrated, a long-run relation
for consumption can also be presented as the
weighted average of non-human wealth and
labour income, both of which are observable
variables. From the point of view of the
macroeconomic importance of the wealth
channel, it is illuminating to transform (2.1)
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The relation (2.2) shows that the size of wealth
elasticity of consumption eW depends, in
addition to mpcW, on the size of the wealth
consumption ratio or, if differentiated across
wealth components, on the wealth consumption
ratio of each wealth component j. We can also
see that the elasticity eW (or eWj), is constant
only if the wealth (or the wealth component j)
to consumption ratio is constant. Given the
wide variations in the wealth to income ratio
indicated by Figure 1 and theoretical priors
suggesting a constant or stationary MPC, this
implies that the logarithmic specification in
estimation may be functionally misspecified,
especially when wealth is disaggregated into
components. Hence, the direct estimation of
MPCs should be preferred to the estimation of
elasticities. Unfortunately this contrasts with
general practice, which has favoured
logarithmic transformation in estimation.
In the following we first concentrate on the
MPC out of wealth. We start by reviewing what
theory suggests concerning the determinants
and appropriate size of the MPC out of wealth.
In addition, we consider whether the size of the
MPC out of wealth should be the same across
countries and across wealth components and, if
not, then why not? Section 3 compares the
composition of wealth across countries. In
Section 4 we shift to the evidence given by
studies based on the use of both micro and
macro data. These studies can be classified into
three approaches: theory-based calibration,
estimated consumption functions with
parameter constraints imposed by economic
theory and direct estimation without theory-
imposed constraints. Our conclusion is that
there is considerably more variation in the
estimates presented in these studies than would
be expected in the light of underlying economic
theory. Therefore, the quality of the data used
in the alternative studies is assessed. Finally a
summarised view on the size of the MPC out of
wealth is proposed based on the aggregate
panel data evidence.
2.1 A THEORETIC REVIEW
In the following we take a closer look at the
wealth effect on consumer expenditure. We
first study the implications of the household
intertemporal budget constraint without any
reference to risk aversion. Thereafter we study
the impact of risk-aversion on the MPC out of
wealth in the framework of the finitely living
overlapping generation model by Blanchard
(1985). Then the effects of income uncertainty
are discussed and, more heuristically, the
likely effects of market imperfections and
distortionary taxation are discussed. Finally,
we consider the implications of dividing asset
price movements into permanent and transitory
components for the asset price effects on
consumption.
2.1.1 IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIFETIME BUDGET
CONSTRAINT
The logic of budget constraints dictates that,
when an individual’s wealth rises, the
individual must either spend that wealth while
living, or leave the money to other individuals,
charities or the government after death.
Nevertheless, the central issue in analysing
wealth effects is timing. If the lag between a
favourable shock to the household balance
sheet and an increase in consumption spending
takes many years to develop, then market
fluctuations may have a limited impact on
aggregate spending. However, if the link from
net worth to consumption is powerful and
immediate, then sharp changes in asset values
may translate into sharp changes in consumer
spending. The following more formal
presentation tries to deepen this insight.6
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Conventional budget constraints faced by
households can be written as follows:
 (2.3)  [] t t t t a t C Y A R A − + = + + 1 , 1  ,
where  At is the aggregate level of real and
financial assets at the end of period t, Yt is non-
property income (i.e. labour income), Ct is
consumption and Ra,t+1(=1 + ra,t+1)  is a time-
varying return on total assets. If At contains
both riskless and risky assets, then Ra,t can be
interpreted as a weighted average of the returns
of these assets. By solving forward and
imposing the transversality condition that at
the end of a finite horizon the limit of

























































Equation (2.4) tells us that today’s total wealth,
which is the sum of real and financial assets and
the discounted sum of expected future labour
income (Wt =A t + Ht), equals the discounted
value of the planned future consumption.
Furthermore, (2.4) implies that as a response to
a permanent unanticipated wealth shock the
discounted sum of future consumption must
rise by an equal amount, i.e.
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where ∆ indicates the difference between the
post-shock and pre-shock values, ∆C refers to
the average level shift in consumption over the
horizon from t to T and 1+ra = Ra  is the average
return on non-human wealth over the horizon
from t to T. Equation (2.5) defines the long-run
MPC out of wealth mpcW conditional on the
positive wealth shock being permanent. In
addition to being dependent on the expected
average return on non-human wealth it is
affected by the horizon of the representative
consumer.
To anchor the empirical analysis of how wealth
affects consumer spending, Table 2.1 follows
Poterba (2000), presenting some benchmark
estimates of the amount by which a household
might increase its consumption if it received a
favourable wealth shock. Table 2.1 reports
values for a feasible annual permanent increase
in consumption (MPC out of wealth),
expressed in cents per one euro (dollar)
increase in wealth, for the ranges of alternative
planning horizons and the average expected
returns on non-human wealth.
The length of planning horizon: For example,
a household with a 30-year planning horizon
that faces a 3% real return of wealth can raise
consumption outlays by five cents for each one
euro increase in wealth. In addition, Table 2.1
shows that the length of planning horizon is
important; the shorter the horizon the higher
Horizon in years
R –
a = 1 + r –
a 15 30 50
1.03 8.1 5.0 3.8 2.9
1.05 9.2 6.4 5.4 4.8
1.07 10.3 7.5 6.8 6.5
Table 2.1 Long-run MPCs out of wealth with
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2 WEALTH
CHANNEL the MPC out of wealth. This relation is non-
linear so that MPC out of wealth values
corresponding to the 30-year horizon are closer
to MPC out of wealth values implied by an
infinite horizon than those implied by a 15-year
horizon.
The following two factors, among others, may
affect the length of the planning horizon and
hence the aggregate level of the MPC out of
wealth.
– It is natural to associate the length of
planning horizon with the expected
remaining lifetime. At a macro level an
implication might be that the more
concentrated wealth is in older generations
the shorter the planning horizon of the
“average” wealth owner and the higher the
MPC out of wealth.
– On the other hand, a strong bequest motive
affects the MPC out of wealth largely in the
same way as the lengthening of the planning
horizon (see, for instance, the discussion by
Campbell and Viceira, 1999).
The rate of return on real and financial
assets: Another determinant of the MPC out of
wealth is the expected rate of return on assets.
The higher it is, the higher is the MPC out of
wealth. However, the required rates of return
may differ across wealth components,
reflecting the risks associated with them.
Therefore, as the relevant discounting rate of
the consumption stream is the weighted
average of the rates of return of individual
wealth components, the allocation of wealth
across risky and less risky assets matters. More
specifically, an increase in the portfolio share
of risky assets should increase the MPC out of
wealth. In addition, if risk premiums vary over
time, a standard assumption in the current
financial literature, then the MPC out of wealth
should also be time-varying. This empirically
testable hypothesis is discussed in Section 4
and Appendix 2 of this report. However, time
variation of the MPC out of wealth may be
reduced if the rate of return used in discounting
the planned consumption stream is not the
current period rate of return, but the expected
average over the planning horizon.
2.1.2 IMPLICATIONS OF RISK AVERSION
The above analysis, based on the lifetime
budget constraint, was not able to account for
the possible effects of risk aversion on
consumption. Therefore, let us assume the
following instantaneous constant relative risk-













t C  ,
where σ ≥ 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (the inverse of relative risk
aversion). Now, in Blanchard’s (1985) finitely
living overlapping generations model with the
constant probability of death π, intertemporal
utility maximisation yields the following MPC
out of total wealth:















with the risk-adjusted return rW defined by
(2.7)
() () () a a W r r r ⋅ − + ⋅ ≈ − + + =
− σ ρ σ ρ
σ σ 1 1 1 1
1
and where ρ is the subjective discount rate.
According to (2.6), mpcW is positively related
to the “risk-adjusted” return rW as well as to the
probability of death (i.e. the inverse of the
expected lifetime Te  =1/π). Equation (2.7)
defines  rW as a weighted average of the
subjective discount rate ρ and the rate of return
on wealth ra. When varying the “risk-adjusted”
return rW and the expected lifetime Te =1/π in
the same range as we varied ra and T in Table
2.1, relation (2.6) gives somewhat higher
figures than those in Table 2.1. For instance,
with Te = 30 the MPCs corresponding to the rW
values of 3%, 5% and 7% would be 6.3, 8.6 and
10.3 cents per one euro permanent increase in
wealth, respectively. These figures are
somewhat higher than corresponding figures in
Table 2.1 (i.e. 5, 6.4 and 7.5 cents). On the
other hand, as shown in Figure 2.1, if  1 0 ≤ <σ ,
which implies high risk-aversion, rW and mpcW
are only partially dependent on the real rate of
return  ra. However, with low risk-aversion,
σ > 1, the long-run real risk-free interest rate8
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(or the subjective discount rate) is no longer the
lower bound for mpcW, as the sign of the
dependence of mpcW on ra changes from
positive to negative. Combining very high
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (i.e.
very low risk aversion) with the plausible
assumption that the real return of wealth ra > ρ,
even negative values for mpcW cannot be ruled
out.
Accordingly, the analysis in the previous
section must be extended to consider
households’ attitudes to risk. When the real
rate of return on wealth ra is higher than the
subjective discount rate, equations (2.6) and





, i.e. a decrease in
risk aversion decreases the MPC out of wealth.1
What then is a plausible the size of mpcW? This
largely depends on whether σ is below or above
unity. Estimates of σ both below and above
unity can be found in the literature, although
most are below unity. For example, much of the
real business cycle (RBC) literature assumes
an elasticity of intertemporal substitution
between a half and one. Recently, Smets and
Wouters (2002) estimated the elasticity of
substitution at 0.6 with euro area data.
Applying this estimate and the assumption that
the subjective discount rate is around the
average long-term government bond rate
(around 3-4%), relation (2.6) produces, with
the same values for ra and Te, a range of mpcW
values similar to that presented in Table 2.1.
2.1.3 IMPLICATIONS OF INCOME UNCERTAINTY
What about uncertainty concerning labour
income? Does it affect the MPC out of wealth?
As closed form decision rules for optimal
consumption in the presence of uncertain
labour income cannot in general be derived,
Zeldes (1989) used numerical methods to
closely approximate the optimal consumption
function and the corresponding value function
for some multi-period problems with uncertain
labour income. One of the most striking
features for his numerical solutions for the
consumption rule under uncertainty was the
introduction of concavity to consumption rules
that were linear in the absence of uncertainty.
Income uncertainty makes the MPC out of
wealth state dependent, i.e. the MPC out of
wealth of a consumer with low wealth was
markedly higher than that of a consumer with
high wealth. Later Carroll and Kimball (1996)
have confirmed that result analytically. They
showed that, except under very special
conditions, adding income uncertainty to the
standard optimisation problem induces a
concave consumption function in which the
MPC out of wealth declines along with the
increasing level of wealth.
2.1.4 DO MARGINAL PROPENSITIES TO CONSUME
OUT OF DIFFERENT WEALTH COMPONENTS
DIFFER?
Total wealth is not homogenous, but consists of
several components with different risk,
collateral and liquidity properties. In addition,
the services associated with each wealth
component vary widely. Therefore, the MPC
out of each wealth component may reflect these
differences. In this section we briefly discuss
this issue, with special attention paid to the
MPC out of the three main components of
1 This effect is strengthened by the reasonable assumption that
the risk premium  ρ − a r also depends positively on the rate of
risk aversion.
Figure 2.1
Risk adjusted rate of return (risk aversion = 1/sigma)
rw = sigma * rho + (1-sigma) * ra    
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CHANNEL household wealth, i.e. non-equity financial
wealth, equity wealth and tangible (mainly
housing) wealth.
2.1.4.1 Implications of market imperfections,
taxation and diversified bequest motives
Typically the behaviour of utility maximising
consumers is analysed assuming unbounded
rationality, perfect capital markets and the
absence of distorting taxes or rigidities. In
these ideal circumstances, where the
composition of wealth can be changed without
friction or cost, the MPCs out of different
wealth components should naturally be equal.
However, this is no longer true when these
assumptions are relaxed. In imperfect capital
markets with distorting taxes and only
boundedly rational consumers, the properties
associated with different wealth components
may well affect their respective MPC. For
instance,
– The liquidity properties of alternative
wealth components may be very different
reflecting, for instance, the fact that the
collateral markets for household borrowing
are underdeveloped in most countries, or at
least have been until recently. Now, if the
only way for a house owner to increase
consumption, as a response to a rise in
housing value, is first to sell the house, it is
quite evident that most house owners will
not react to the increase in the market value
of housing. Moreover, even in well-
developed financial markets, the required
capital adequacy ratios of banks may induce
the banks to evaluate collateral values of
assets below their market values. These
arguments suggest that the MPC out of each
wealth component depends positively on
the liquidity of the asset in question and
negatively on the ratio of the market value
of the asset to its collateral value.
– From the point of view of the bequest
motive, wealth components are not similar.
For instance, property (including shares)
coupled with entrepreneurship (e.g. the
“family business”) may be associated with a
much stronger bequest motive and, hence, a
lower MPC out of wealth, than other wealth
components. In addition, fiscal distortions
(e.g. estate taxes) may favour some assets
for consumption and others for bequests.
– Similarly, Thaler (1994) argued that
“mental accounting”, which dictates that
some assets are more appropriate for
current consumption while others are better
for long-term savings, may result in
different MPCs out of wealth across wealth
components. Many behavioural studies
support this view. As saving requires
willpower, it is easier for many consumers
to save from lump-sum payments or from
capital gains rather than from “regular
income”.
2.1.4.2 Implications of the (un)predictability of
asset prices
Efficient financial markets are the underlying
assumption in most of the macroeconomic
modelling work. This hypothesis implies that
asset prices follow a random walk so that all
movements are unpredictable or, equivalently,
all asset price movements are expected to be
permanent. Under this interpretation, the
expected rate of return (discount rate) is
constant and changes in asset prices generate
changes in consumption.
However, the underlying hypothesis of
efficient financial markets with a constant
discount rate (or constant expected rate of
return) was challenged by Shiller (1981) and
LeRoy and Porter (1981), who argued that
stock returns were too volatile to be accounted
for by variation in future dividend growth with
constant discount rates. There is now a large
and growing body of empirical literature in
financial economics which finds that aggregate
stock market returns are predictable over long
horizons (see e.g. Shiller, 1984, Campbell and
Shiller, 1988, Fama and French, 1988,
Hodrick, 1992, Lamont, 1998, Lettau and
Ludvigson, 2001, Campbell, 2001, Lewellen,
2001, and Campbell and Goto, 2002). This
suggests that conditional expected returns, or10
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discount rates, vary over time, possibly driven
by cyclical variation in risk aversion (see e.g.
Sundaresan, 1989, Constantinides, 1990,
Campbell and Cochrane, 1999, and Cochrane,
2001, Chapter 20).
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) present a
consumption-based model that explains,
among a wide variety of dynamic asset-pricing
phenomena, the long-run predictability of
excess stock returns (mean reversion). The key
element of their explanation is the time-
varying habit, or subsistence, level of
consumption added to the constant risk-
aversion utility function. However, in
calibrating their model to actual data, they
found that the process defining the habit level
of consumption must be slow-moving and non-
linear to be able to generate mean reversion of
asset prices. Although the question of whether
these requirements are compatible with actual
data is largely untested, Fuhrer (2000), for
instance, found that one period lag of
consumption, instead of its long lag
distribution, was sufficient to capture the habit
formation effect on consumption.
Anyway, independently from possible
theoretical explanations, the division of asset
price movements into the expected permanent
and transitory components may affect the MPC
out of equity wealth. To clarify this issue
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) used a more data-
oriented approach. They examined the
implications of the intertemporal budget
constraint to the long-run cointegration
relationship between consumption, income and
wealth. Taking as their basis the work of
Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and Campbell
(1996), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) showed
that the log approximation of the budget
constraint (2.4) can be presented in the
following form (lowercase letters denote log
variables):
(2.8) () t t t y a c α α = − − ⋅ − 1
() [] {} () t
i
i t i t h i t a
i
w t z c r r E α α α ρ − + ∑ ∆ − ⋅ − + ⋅
∞
=
+ + + 1 1
1
, ,
                                                                                           
() [] {} () t
i
i t i t h i t
i
w t z c r a E α α α ρ − + ∑ ∆ − ⋅ − + ∆ ⋅ ≈
∞
=
+ + + 1 1
1
,
where  i t h r + ,  is real net return on human wealth
and  i t i t a a r + + ∆ ≈ , , see Campbell, Lo and
MacKinlay (1997). Parameter α is the average
share of non-human wealth in total wealth
(equalling approximately the GDP share of
non-labour income) and zt is the residual of the
cointegrating relationship between human
wealth ht and labour income yt. If all the right-
hand-side variables of (2.8) are presumed
stationary, then c, a and y must be cointegrated,
and the left-hand side of (2.8) gives the
deviation in the common trend of ct, at and yt.
It follows that the real effects of changes in the
market valuation of wealth depend on how the
adjustment burden of the cointegration residual
implied by the left-hand side of (2.8) is fed back
to consumption, labour income and the market
value of non-financial wealth, reflecting
fluctuations in expected returns on wealth. If
the mean reversion tendency of asset prices is
strong, which implies a strong transitory
component in asset prices, dynamic effects on
consumption may remain modest although the
dynamic equation estimated for consumption
would contain a large and significant
coefficient for the lagged cointegration
residual. This aspect is stressed by Lettau and
Ludvigson (2002) and, especially, by Lettau,
Ludvigson and Barczi (2001) in their comment
on Davis and Palumbo (2001).
As a better summary statistic, which would
account for the finding that much of the
variation in wealth is transitory and
uncorrelated with consumer spending, Lettau
and Ludvigson (2002) propose the following
corrected measure:














W corr mpc mpc
where γ  is the is the share of the transitory
component in the variance of wealth.11
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CHANNEL However, as mean reversion in asset prices
reflects fluctuations in expected returns on
equity wealth, this issue is also related to the
possible time-variance of the MPC out of
wealth as is discussed by Palumbo et al. (2002)
and in Appendix 2 of this report.
2.1.4.3 Marginal propensities to consume out of
non-equity financial wealth, equity
wealth and housing wealth
We now briefly review the discussion of the
relative sizes of the MPC out of the three main
components of household wealth: non-equity
financial wealth, equity wealth and housing
wealth. In line with our discussion in two
previous sub-sections, there appears to be
general agreement that, if the MPC out of
wealth differs across these wealth components,
then the MPC out of non-equity financial
wealth is likely to be highest. However, the
relative sizes of the MPCs out of equity wealth
and out of housing wealth is more
controversial. For both of these wealth
components the main variation in their market
values comes from the price rather than the
volume component. Hence, the sensitivity of
consumption to these price movements may
depend on how liquid these asset are and how
permanent the price changes are expected to be,
i.e. whether the mean reversion tendency is
associated with asset price changes. The
following arguments have been presented in
favour of a higher MPC out of housing wealth:
– Since equity prices are more volatile than
house prices, households may find it more
difficult to assess whether a change in the
equity wealth is permanent or temporary.
Therefore, they are likely to be more
cautious in adapting consumption plans to
changes in equity wealth than in housing
wealth.
– Since house purchases are generally
financed with borrowed money, increases
in property values result in a higher net
return on this investment than on other
assets, implying that the MPC out of
housing wealth may be larger than for assets
with lower expected returns.
– In most countries housing wealth is more
evenly distributed than equity holdings,
which are concentrated in the upper tail of
income distribution. If, as some studies
indicate, the MPC is lower among the
richest households, then, at the aggregate
level, the wealth effect from housing may
be expected to be more important than the
effect from equity wealth.
– In some countries, differential tax-
treatment of equity holdings and residential
property may lower the MPC out of equity
wealth because stock holdings have to be
retained to receive a more favourable tax-
treatment.
On the other hand, a partial equilibrium
analysis may suggest a less clear-cut housing
wealth effect on consumption because of the
dual effects of house prices on non-housing
consumption, i.e. a positive wealth effect,
which depend on the liquidity of houses, and a
negative relative price effect.2 Since houses are
part of household wealth, changes in their
value are expected to have a positive effect on
the consumption of homeowners. Conversely,
for tenants, an increase in house prices leads to
higher rental prices and a negative income
impact on their consumption. However, the
wealth effect for landlords or pension funds
and similar institutional investors owning
rental housing has also to be considered. This
wealth effect, at least to the extent that the
landlords belong to the household sector,
neutralises the negative consumption effects of
the rent paid by tenants. However, typically a
proportion of tenants are also future
homeowners, who with limited access to the
mortgage market have to increase savings in
response to rising house prices in order to be
able to purchase a house later. Hence, if
2 See Muellbauer and Lattimore (1995), for a clear exposition
of this dual role.12
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households are divided into house owners
(including landlords) and tenants, a positive
relation between consumption and house prices
would be expected for house owners and a close
to zero (slightly negative) relation for tenants.
In addition, the wealth effect is the smaller the
less liquid the housing property is. According
to Maclennan, Muellbauer and Stephens (1998)
the perceived liquidity of housing assets varies
a lot across Europe. This is due to, among other
things, differences in transaction costs (e.g.
stamp duties), the collateral role of the assets
and inheritance taxes, particularly when
housing is sheltered from inheritance taxes,
which can be translated into a restriction on
resale. Under these circumstances, other things
being equal, they conclude:
– The higher the proportion of owner-
occupiers and the lower the proportion of
households in the rented market, the larger
will be the consumption response to a rise in
house prices.
– The larger the proportion of rental housing
which is owned by pension funds and
similar institutional investors, the smaller
will be the consumption response to a rise in
house prices. The reason is that (future)
pensions are rather illiquid component of
consumers’ portfolios. 3
2.2 SOME CONCLUSIONS
On the basis of the discussion in Section 2 the
following conclusions can be drawn:
– The long-run MPC out of different wealth
components should be quite stable over
time. The main determinants are the length
of the planning horizon, the bequest motive
and a weighted average of the expected rate
of return on wealth (over the planning
horizon) and the subjective discount rate.
– Risk aversion associated with uncertainty
widens the range of feasible values for the
MPC out of wealth mpcW. With the plausible
values of risk aversion (1/σ ≥1 )  mpcW
increases with the rate of return ra, but the
opposite is true, if risk aversion is low, i.e.
0 ≤1 / σ <1. Hence, low relative risk
aversion allows for low values of mpcW.
– With typical estimates of risk aversion
(1 ≤1 / σ ≤ 3), the MPC out of wealth should
be above the subjective discount rate.
– Income uncertainty implies that the MPC
out of wealth of wealthy consumers may be
markedly lower than that of consumers with
low wealth. For instance, if equity wealth is
concentrated in the upper end of income
distribution, then at the aggregate level the
MPC out of equity wealth may be lower
than the MPC out of other wealth
components.
– The MPC out of wealth may differ across
wealth components as a reflection of
differences in liquidity properties and
bequest motives associated with them.
These cross asset differences may be
strongly affected by developments in
collateral markets and taxation.
– The transmission of asset price changes to
consumption is largely determined by how
permanent asset price changes are expected
to be. Changes that are expected to be
transitory have less effect on consumption.
This issue is linked to the predictability of
equity market returns.
– If the MPC out of wealth differs across
wealth components, then the MPC out of
non-equity financial wealth is likely to be
highest. However, there are diverging
views regarding the relative sizes of the
MPCs out of equity wealth and out of
housing wealth.
3 This is in line with Poterba (2000), who argued that pension
funds and houses are long-term “locked” assets, the MPC out
of which is lower than out of “unlocked” assets.13
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3 HOUSEHOLD WEALTH: A STATISTICAL
REVIEW
To give statistical background to our
international comparison of estimated wealth
and asset market effects on consumption we
first make an international comparison of
household wealth and wealth composition. The
theoretical review in Section 2 revealed that the
composition of wealth, its distribution across
income classes and age groups, and
demographics may have importance in the
international comparison of wealth effects.
Therefore, in sub-section 3.1, we first compare
household wealth and its decomposition into
financial and housing wealth across countries.4
Then the decomposition of financial wealth
across counties is presented in sub-section 3.2.
Since planning horizons and bequest motives
can vary across consumers and across wealth
components, sub-section 3.3 reports cross-
country comparisons of wealth distributions
across income classes and age groups. Special
attention is also paid to housing wealth and
house prices and to equity wealth.
3.1 DECOMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD WEALTH
INTO FINANCIAL AND HOUSING WEALTH
Table 3.1 reports the decomposition of total
household wealth into its two main
components, i.e. financial and housing wealth,
in 1995 and 2000 for six EU countries and the
United States.5 Each wealth component is
presented as a percentage of GDP and a
percentage of total wealth. As can be seen, the
ratios to GDP of both total household wealth
and its components vary considerably both
over time and across countries. In 2000 total
household wealth was highest in Spain, at
521% of GDP, and lowest in Germany, at 371%
of GDP.
Regarding the composition of total household
wealth, financial wealth dominates in the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the
United States with financial wealth shares
above 60%. In 2000 the financial assets to GDP
ratio was highest in the United States (341%),
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (both
around 300%). In continental Europe this ratio
was lower: somewhat above 200% in France
and Italy and somewhat below 200% in Spain
and Germany. In the period 1995-2000
financial wealth rose as a percentage of GDP in
all countries as a result of strong equity price
increases. The increase in this ratio was
particularly strong in France (69 percentage
points) and lowest in Germany (31 percentage
points).
Table 3.1 Total household wealth decomposed into financial and housing wealth
United United
France Germany Italy Spain Netherlands Kingdom States
1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000
Financial assets
% of GDP 165 234 149 180 189 227 150 187 254 297 261 299 292 341
% of wealth 50 53 44 49 45 51 33 36 69 62 64 61 71 73
Housing wealth
% of  GDP 170 206 191 191 234 220 298 334 112 182 146 191 120 130
% of wealth 50 47 56 51 55 49 67 64 31 38 36 39 29 27
Total wealth
% of GDP 335 440 340 371 423 447 448 521 366 479 407 490 412 471
% of wealth 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
4 For a comprehensive presentation of EU housing markets, see
ECB (2003).
5 The statistical source for financial assets is same as in Table
3.2. Housing wealth is drawn from OECD sources except for
Spain and the Netherlands, which is from Arnold et al. (2002).
Therefore, the figures in Table 3.1 are not fully comparable
and should be only taken as indicative.14
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However, in spite of this development housing
wealth continues to play an important role in all
countries but, especially, in France, Germany,
Italy and Spain where the housing wealth share
is close to or above 50%. Reflecting cross-
country differences in house price
developments, the ratio of housing wealth to
GDP and the share of housing in total wealth
decreased in Italy and Germany by about 5
percentage points in 1995-2000. In all other
countries, real house prices rose, increasing the
ratio of housing wealth to GDP. In the United
Kingdom house prices rose so much that the
share of housing in total household wealth also
increased. Hence, housing prices appear to be
markedly less synchronised and their volatility
varies more across countries than is the case
with stock prices.
3. 2 DECOMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD
FINANCIAL WEALTH INTO COMPONENTS6
Over the past decade financial markets have
moved towards greater integration as well as
product innovation. In Europe, the removal of
capital controls, the privatisation of public
utilities and recent pension reforms are some of
the policy interventions which have
transformed financial markets and
consequently affected the allocation of
household wealth.
This can be seen in Table 3.2, which shows the
allocation of the financial wealth of households
among its six main components in 1995 and
2000 in the same countries as in Table 3.1.7
Pension funds are the major factor in
explaining the differences in the financial
wealth to GDP ratio among the three countries
with the highest ratio, i.e. the United States, the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands, where
the financing of pensions is mainly fund-based,
and four countries with markedly lower ratios,
i.e. France, Germany, Italy and Spain, where
the financing of pensions is based mainly on
“pay-as-you-go”.
The share of stock market related wealth
(stocks plus mutual funds in Table 3.2) is
highest in the United States (46%) and it is
almost as high in Italy and Spain (about 43.5%
in 2000). All in all, the increase in the share of
this risky wealth component was notably faster
in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain than in the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the
United States during the later half of 1990s.
United United
France Germany Italy Spain Netherlands Kingdom States
1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000
Currency and deposits 39.1 30.4 41.9 36.2 40.1 24.1 51.8 36.2 22.5 18.1 24.2 22.2 14.1 11.1
Securities other
than stocks 5.5 2.7 13.5 10.1 30.7 18.7 4.2 1.9 3.3 2.3 1.6 1.3 9.4 6.4
Stocks 15.8 24.8 10.9 15.6 14.5 27.6 19.0 33.7 15.4 16.8 15.7 17.4 32.0 33.1
Mutual funds 8.6 9.0 5.9 10.5 3.1 15.9 6.2 9.9 3.6 5.5 3.8 5.5 9.6 12.9
Life insurance 17.9 23.3 11.8 13.6 3.3 6.2 4.5 6.2 15.3 15.4 27.7 27.5 7.1 7.1
Pension funds 1.8 1.5 5.6 5.2 0.8 1.2 4.5 5.3 35.5 37.7 22.3 22.1 23.4 23.8
Financial assets
as % of GDP 165 234 149 180 189 227 n.a. 187 n.a. 297 261 299 292 341
Table 3.2 Composition of financial assets of households and total household wealth
(as % of financial assets, unless otherwise indicated)
6 This section is mainly based on Babeau and Sbano (2002) and
Guiso et al. (2002).
7 The “household” in Table 3.2 includes non-profit institutions
serving households (e.g. churches, consumer associations,
labour unions) and the self-employed.15
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The shift towards riskier assets is divided
differently across countries between direct
holdings of equities and investments in mutual
funds. The portion of wealth held in mutual
funds is rising everywhere, but especially in
Italy and Germany. The tendency to take
greater risks is also apparent in the proportion
of equity funds within investment funds as a
whole: they have increased their share in five of
the six countries.
By contrast, euro area countries have
experienced a generalised decline in banking
intermediation. This trend is particularly
noticeable in Spain, Italy and France and to a
lesser extent in Germany. The decline has less
of an impact on sight/overnight deposits than
on term and savings deposits. There has also
been a sharp decline in the portion of interest-
bearing securities (bonds and loans), mainly
due to the decline in long-term interest rates
and efforts to improve public finances. This
trend is particularly visible in Italy, where the
share of such investments was above 30% in the
early 1990s (the highest ratio in the euro area)
and fell to 18.7% in 2000.
Household claims on insurance companies
grew over the period considered in France and,
to lesser extent, in Germany, Italy and Spain. In
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the United Kingdom and the Netherlands,
where life insurance assets were already very
high at the beginning of the period, they
remained roughly stable. For saving purposes,
life insurance policies are often perceived to be
low risk. However this changed recently with
the spectacular growth of unit-linked policies
in Italy, France and Spain. Since the late 1980s
such policies have already played an important
role in the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands. Only in Germany was there no
evidence of this move towards riskier assets.
Available financial wealth data indicate
surprisingly large variations across countries
in the ratio of wealth to consumption. Based on
national sources, Chart 3.1 shows that the ratio
of total wealth to consumption is highest in the
Netherlands, at around twice the level in
Germany, where this ratio is lowest.8 If the
MPC out of wealth were equal across countries,
then relation (2.2) would imply that the wealth
elasticity of consumption in the Netherlands
would also be around twice that of Germany.
Although the role of pension funds explains a
large part of these cross-country differences in
the ratio of financial wealth to consumption,
remaining differences are still important and
difficult to explain. It may be that, rather than
true differences, they reflect different methods
of measuring wealth and, therefore, problems
of data comparability. We return this issue in
the sub-section 4.4.
3.3 EQUITY WEALTH EFFECT, INCOME
DISTRIBUTION AND DEMOGRAPHICS
In Section 2 we showed that the distribution of
wealth may affect aggregate MPCs out of
different wealth components. Coupled with
demographic factors, this may help explain
cross-country differences in wealth effects. In
this section we study the distribution of wealth,
especially equity wealth, across income
earners and age cohorts in different countries.
8 Financial wealth data in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 are not fully
compatible with data used in Chart 3.1.16
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Table 3.3 reports recent equity holdings across
different income brackets in Germany, France,
Italy, the United Kingdom and the United
States. Table 3.4 presents the distribution of
equity ownership across different age groups in
the same countries.
The last column of both tables reveals that
share ownership is much more concentrated in
the three euro area countries than in the United
States and the United Kingdom. While in the
United States around 20% of the population
own shares, this proportion falls to around 8%
in Italy (in 1998), 10% in Germany (in 2000)
and 13% in France (in 2000).9 In the United
Kingdom, more than 20% of the population
owns shares.
France All
Income group (EUR) 0-1500 1500-2300 2300-3050 3050-3800 3800-
Income group by percentile 0-32 32-65 65-83 83-91 91-100
Percentage owning equity:
in 1997 6.1 10.1 15.5 19.1 32.6 12.0
in 2000 7.4 11.2 14.3 21.1 31.4 12.7
Germany
Income group (EUR) 0-1300 1300-2050 2050-3050 3050-4100 4100-
Income group by percentile 0-21 21-51 51-84 84-93 93-100
Percentage owning equity:
in 1997 1.7 3.9 8.3 14.6 18.7 6.2
in 2000 3.0 5.8 11.4 20.4 25.9 9.8
Italy
Income group (EUR) 0-850 850-1700 1700-2600 2600-3450 3450-
Income group by percentile 0-18 18-51 51-74 74-87 87-100
Percentage owning equity:
in 1995 0.2 2.0 5.0 10.3 21.5 5.0
in 1998 0.6 2.4 5.7 11.9 31.7 7.8
United Kingdom
Income group by percentile 0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100
Percentage owning equity:
in 1993 8.2 14.8 27.0 41.3 22.8
in 1996 13.4 15.6 26.5 37.9 23.3
United States
Income group (USD) 0-850 850-2100 2100-4150 4150-8350 8350-
Income group by percentile 0-13 13-37 37-66 66-91 91-100
Percentage owning equity:
in 1995 2.3 8.4 13.9 24.7 43.6 15.2
in 1998 3.8 7.2 17.7 27.7 56.6 19.2
Sources: “Equity wealth and consumption – the experience of Germany, France and Italy in an international context”, Bank of
England Quarterly Bulletin, Spring 2002, p. 81. The original sources are provided there.
Notes: The table shows the proportion of each income group holding direct equities excluding mutual funds. Numbers are not fully
comparable across countries due to different definitions of households.
Table 3.3 Percentage of households with direct equity holdings, by income group
Common features across countries are that (1)
the percentage of households holding equities
has increased and (2) the share of equity owners
in each income bracket is positively related to
the income level. In Table 3.3 the proportion of
households holding shares in the highest
income bracket is between 2 and 4 times larger
than the average proportion in the population.
The proportion of share ownership in high
income brackets is larger in the United States
9 Figures reported here are not fully comparable across
countries because of differences in the definition of
households. In particular, the figures for Germany may
underestimate the percentage of households holding equities
as they refer to the population above 14 years of age, while for
Italy and the United States a household is defined as an
economic unit that includes more than one person on average.17
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and the United Kingdom than in the three euro
area countries, although in this respect the
differences between countries appear less
marked than for the population averages. In
addition, Table 3.3 shows that the percentage
of middle-to-low income earners holding
shares is larger in the United States and the
United Kingdom than in the euro area
countries. If coupled with the higher MPC out
of wealth of the poor relative to the wealthy,
this may justify, at least qualitatively, a higher
MPC out of equity wealth in the United
Kingdom and the United States than in
Germany, France and Italy.
France All
Age group 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-
Percentage of  population 13.0 14.5 14.6 13.9 9.2 15.9
Percentage owning equity:
in 1997 3.7 7.9 10.2 14.6 17.9 19.2 12.0
in 2000 3.3 9.1 11.6 17.6 16.9 18.3 12.7
Germany
Age group 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-
Percentage of  population 6.7 11.9 17.2 14.5 12.2 23.0
Percentage owning equity:
in 1997 1.0 4.4 7.3 8.7 8.7 4.9 6.2
in 2000 2.4 7.6 13.5 11.7 13.1 7.2 9.2
Italy
Age group 15-30 31-40 41-50 51-65 65-
Percentage of  population 22.2 15.5 13.5 17.9 16.3
Percentage owning equity:
in 1995 2.1 5.7 5.6 6.6 2.9 5.0
in 1998 3.9 9.8 7.9 9.5 5.5 7.8
United Kingdom
Age group 25-34 35-49 50-64 65-
Percentage of  population 16.0 20.7 15.6 15.7
Percentage owning equity:
in 1993 12.8 24.1 30.4 24.7 n.a.
in 1996 12.9 21.6 30.2 31.2 n.a.
United States
Age group 0-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-
Percentage of  population 23.3 23.3 19.2 12.8 11.2 10.2
Percentage owning equity:
in 1995 10.8 14.6 17.7 15.0 18.6 19.7 15.2
in 1998 13.1 18.9 22.6 25.0 21.0 18.0 19.2
Table 3.4 Percentage of households with direct equity holdings, by age group
Sources: “Equity wealth and consumption – the experience of Germany, France and Italy in an international context”, Bank of
England Quarterly Bulletin, Spring 2002, p. 81. The original sources are provided there.
Notes: The table shows the proportion of each age group holding equities directly, excluding mutual funds. Numbers are not fully
comparable across countries due to different definitions of households.
Table 3.4 shows that equity ownership is more
evenly distributed across age groups than
across income brackets, except for the
youngest age group. However, a positive
relation between equity holdings and age is
apparent, especially, in the United Kingdom
and the United States. In Germany and Italy
this relation turns to negative among retired
age groups. Therefore, if the MPC out of wealth
is higher for older generations, reflecting a
shorter planning horizon, then this may also
justify a higher MPC out of equity wealth in the
United States and the United Kingdom than in
Germany, France and Italy.18
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4 ASSET PRICE EFFECTS VIA THE WEALTH
CHANNEL: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
This section reviews cross-country empirical
evidence of wealth effects on consumption.
Sub-section 4.1 presents evidence based on
micro-data studies, which are most closely
linked to data characteristics examined in
Section 3. The merit of the micro-data
approach is its ability to separate direct and
indirect wealth effects. Sub-section 4.2
presents MPCs out of wealth in theory-based
calibrated multi-country models. Sub-section
4.3.1 discusses MPC out of wealth estimates
based on time-series estimation of the deep
parameters of theory-based consumption
functions. In sub-section 4.3.2 we review
results based on direct (unconstrained)
aggregate time-series estimations. Although
the available evidence mostly suggest an
important wealth channel, our general
conclusion is that the variation of MPC out of
wealth estimates across studies, across
countries and across estimation methods is
disconcertingly large. Such differences in
typical MPC out of wealth estimates across
countries are implausible in the light of
economic theory. In sub-section 4.4, after a
critical assessment of the wealth data used in
cross-country comparisons, we propose that
incomparable measures of wealth across
countries and across studies may be an
important source of differences in MPC out of
wealth estimates. To reduce these problems in
wealth data, sub-section 4.5 presents some
recent estimation results based on dynamic
panel approach. Sub-section 4.6 concludes.
4.1 MICRO DATA EVIDENCE
This section briefly surveys the evidence from
micro-level studies. Unfortunately most of
these studies are limited to US data. Recent
exceptions are studies by Paiella (2003) and
Guiso, Paiella and Visco (2004) using Italian
data. In addition, all these studies use datasets
with limited coverage of consumption and/or
asset holdings. Thus, key parameter estimates
may not always be directly comparable to their
macroeconomic counterparts. However,
micro-level studies provide a useful check on
whether theories of the wealth effect are
consistent with individual behaviour.
There are a large number of micro-data studies
of various aspects of the wealth effect and, as is
often the case with such literature, these
studies have frequently come to different
conclusions. However, a reasonable
interpretation of these studies is that they tend
to back up the macroeconomic evidence on the
role of the wealth effect.10
A number of studies of have analysed the
relationship between equity wealth and
consumption within the consumption-based
capital asset pricing model (C-CAPM). For
example Mankiw and Zeldes (1990), Attanasio,
Banks and Tanner (1998), Vissing-Jørgensen,
(1999), and Brav, Constantinides and Geczy
(1999) find that the spending of stockholders is
more highly correlated with stock market
returns than that of non-stockholders, which
supports a direct effect. Less positively, Parker
(1999b) and Juster, Lupton, Smith and Stafford
(1999) both find that spending responds to
wealth at the household level, but neither paper
can pinpoint responses within the time frame
necessary to explain the macro relationship.
A comprehensive study by Maki and Palumbo
(2001) provides important evidence in favour
of the wealth effect on US consumer spending
during the 1990s. Using data from the Survey
of Consumer Finances, they find that the
groups of families whose portfolios were
boosted most by the exceptional stock market
performance over the latter half of the 1990s
are the same groups whose net saving flows
declined most sharply between 1995 and 2000.
10 Of course, one can find some evidence to the contrary. For
example, Starr-McCluer’s (2000) analysis of qualitative
evidence from the University of Michigan’s SRC Survey of
Consumers suggests that the spending of stockholders is only
modestly affected by changes in wealth, and Otto (1999) finds
that the correlation between stock prices and consumer
sentiment does not vary by stock ownership.19
ECB








Families who owned relatively modest
amounts of equity wealth – the vast majority of
US households – experienced relatively small
gains in net worth to income ratios over the
1990s and continued to save at about the same
steady pace over the decade. In addition, Maki
and Palumbo’s study verifies that essentially
all of the increased spending apparent in the
aggregate data can be attributed to an increase
in the MPC out of income of the richest US
households. Finally, they present new
econometric estimates of the MPC out of
household net worth based on cohort-level
time-series data that fall in the same range – 3
to 5 cents per dollar – as typical
macroeconomic estimates (although somewhat
lower than the preferred estimates in Table 2
above). These econometric results bolster the
conclusion that the direct wealth effect on
household spending is of the right size to
explain the sharp decline in the aggregate
saving rate observed in the 1990s.
These results are also compatible with those of
Dynan and Maki (2001) who use data from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey and imputed
values of equity holdings to estimate the effects
of stock market wealth on consumption. They
find that direct wealth effects begin to show up
relatively quickly and continue to boost
consumption growth for a number of quarters,
which is in line with aggregate estimates. In
contrast to many earlier studies, they find that
the indirect wealth channel is not an important
determinant of consumption growth. This study
also reports estimates of the MPC out of stock
market wealth of between 5 and 15 cents per
dollar, but notes that its sample excludes high-
income households likely to have lower MPCs.
Indeed, both Parker (1999a) and Dynan et al.
(2000) show that the average propensity to
consume declines with permanent income.11
Evidence found by Paiella (2003) and,
especially, by Guiso, Paiella and Visco (2004)
for Italy, resemble in many respects the US
evidence described above, although the
estimated size of the wealth effect is smaller
than typical US estimates. The estimates of
MPC were around 2 cents per euro out of total
wealth and out of housing wealth, respectively,
and slightly below 4 cents per euro out of net
financial wealth. However, when dividing their
data into homeowners and tenants Guiso,
Paiella and Visco (2004) found that the MPC
out of housing wealth (excluding current
period capital gains on real estate) and the MPC
out of capital gains on real estate were 2 and 3.5
cents per euro, respectively. For tenants they
did not find any statistically significant
relation between consumption and capital
gains on real estate (or house prices), but the
estimated MPC out of net wealth was in the
range of 3.7 to 6.2 cents per euro. All these
results support direct effects from wealth and
its components on consumption. Regarding
equity wealth effects on consumption, both
studies found hardly any evidence for the MPC
out of equity wealth. However, it is quite likely
that this result contains a downward bias,
because households at the top of the income
and wealth distribution were underrepresented
in the survey data.
4.2 THE MPC OUT OF WEALTH IN SOME
CALIBRATED THEORY-BASED MODELS
In theoretically-founded models, such as the
IMF’s MULTIMOD, deep structural
parameters such as the rates of return and the
planning horizon are calibrated. The calibrated
MPCs out of wealth of MULTIMOD provide a
theory-consistent guide to reasonable
benchmark for the MPC out of wealth to be
expected from empirical research.
Chart 4.1 shows the MPC out of wealth implied
by MULTIMOD. These MPCs out of wealth are
based on the Mark III version, as this provides
separate MPCs out of wealth for the countries
of the euro area. These MPCs out of wealth
range between 5.4 and 8.2 per cent. The highest
values are those for the United States and
11 It is worth noting, however, that while the average propensity
to consume depends on wealth, this does not imply that the
same must be true for the MPC out of wealth.20
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Canada, followed closely by those for the
United Kingdom and Japan; the values for the
euro area economies are somewhat below 6.
Overall, the MPC out of wealth tends to be
quite similar across countries. In fact, three of
the four parameters determining the MPC out
of wealth in MULTIMOD – the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in consumption, the
real interest rate, the probability of death – are
the same across countries in the long run, as a
result of calibration or pooled estimation (see
Faruquee, Isard, Laxton, Prasad and
Turtelboom (1998)).
4.3 AGGREGATE TIME SERIES ESTIMATES OF
MPC OUT OF WEALTH:
The following sub-section reviews estimates
based on time-series estimation of the deep
parameters of theory-based consumption
functions. Sub-section 4.3.2 examines the
evidence based on aggregate time series
estimation without theory-based parameter
constraints.
4.3.1 MPC OUT OF WEALTH BASED ON THE
ESTIMATED DEEP PARAMETERS OF THE
CONSUMPTION FUNCTION
Not many studies estimate the consumption
function explicitly in terms of deep parameters.
Some exceptions are Hayashi (1982b), Darby
et al. (1999), Sefton and in’t Veld (1999),
Chart 4.1 Theoretically calibrated MPC out
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Fuhrer (2000) and Willman (2003). Through
quasi-differing human wealth in the stochastic
permanent income hypothesis consumption
function, Hayashi (1982b) estimates the
solved-out consumption function (1982) for the
United States and Darby et al. (1999) for the
United Kingdom. Sefton and in’t Veld (1999)
apply the Blanchard (1985) overlapping
generations model with positive probability of
death. Willman (2003), in the framework of the
overlapping generation model, also account for
habit formation. Hayashi (1982b) and Darby et
al. (1999) directly estimate the MPC out of
wealth. In Sefton and in’t Veld (1999) and in
Willman (2003) the estimated length of
planning horizon (probability of death) is the
crucial determinant of the MPC out of wealth,
as shown by equation (2.6).
Hayashi’s (1982b) estimates of MPC out of
wealth were in the theoretically reasonable
range of 3.3 to 8.6 with the preferred point
estimate at 6.8 cents per dollar, which is very
close to the Darby et al. (1999) point estimate
of 7.1 pence per pound for the UK. In Sefton
and in’t Veld (1999) estimates of MPC out of
wealth were in the range of 3 to 16 cents per
dollar for the United States, 9 cents per dollar
for Canada, 6 to 7 pence per pound for the
United Kingdom and 4 to 9 pfennigs per
Deutsche Mark for Germany. Willman (2003)
estimated the consumption function using
aggregated quarterly euro area data and found
an MPC out of wealth in the range of 7-10 cents
per euro for the planning horizon in the range of
12-32 years. Estimates for the habit persistence
parameter defining the adjustment speed from
shocks to consumption was in the range of 0.7
to 0.8. Apart from Sefton and in’t Veld’s
outlying estimates in the upper limit of the
range, the ranges of these estimates were quite
reasonable and broadly in line with those
calibrated for MULTIMOD. Further, these
results indicate no clear evidence for the MPC
out of wealth being lower in continental Europe
than in the English-speaking countries.21
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Euro area Germany United Kingdom United States Canada
Hayashi(1982b) 3.3-8.6
Darby et al.(1999) 7.1
Sefton and in’t Veld (1999) 4-9 6-7 3-16 9
Willman(2003) 7-10
Table 4.1 MPC out of wealth estimates based on the solved-out consumption functions
4.3.2 AGGREGATE TIME SERIES ESTIMATE OF
MPC OUT OF WEALTH: DIRECT DATA-BASED
APPROACH
This sub-section reviews the available
evidence on the long-long run effects of wealth
and its components on consumption. First we
review some recent comparative international
studies on the long-run effects of wealth and its
components on consumption. Then we present
estimation results based on country-specific
studies.
4.3.2.1 Evidence based on cross-country studies
International comparisons include: Ludwig
and Sløk (2002), Bertaut (2002), Boone et al.
(1998), Labhard et al. (2005) Case et al. (2001)
and Edison and Sløk (2001).
Ludwig and Sløk (2002) use a panel data of 16
OECD countries, where countries are
classified (on ad hoc bases) as market-based
and bank-based economies. As shown in Table
4.2, pooled results for market-based economies
(Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Ireland,
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United
States) imply that a 10% increase in equity
prices increases long-run consumption by
nearly 1%, while in bank-based economies
(Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Norway and Spain) the estimated elasticity is
much smaller at 0.4%.
Ludwig and Sløk provide MPCs out of equity
wealth for a subset of countries. Reported
MPCs are in a range of between 1.4 and 4.9,
Table 4.2 Estimates of MPC and elasticities out of wealth components
BE FR DE IT NL PT SP SE UK US CA JP
Ludwig and Sløk (2002)
mpcW 1.4 2.0 3.0 - - 4.9 4.0 4.0 4.0
eW-H 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.11
eW-EQ 0.04 0.04  0.04 0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.04
Bertaut (2002)
mpcW - - - - - 4.3 5.4 8.3 -
mpcW-F 2.7 - - 4.2 5.9 9.7 10.6
mpcW-H -- - 9 . 7--
mpcW-EQ - - - 6.2 8.7 -
eW - - - - - 0.20 0.29 0.41 -
eW-F 0.10 - - - - 0.09 0.23 0.16 0.29
eW-H - - - - - 0.09 0.14 0.16 -
eW-EQ - - - - - - 0.10 0.14 -
(eEQ-Price) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02)
Boone et al. (1998)
(eEQ-Price) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
Labhard, Sterne and
Young1) (2005)
mpcW 0.7 0.8 7.8 2.8 1.3 -1.0 3.6 5.6 3.7 7.8 4.2
eW 0.03 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.06 -0.02 0.07 0.16 0.12 0.19 0.16
Legend: mpcW-j and elasticity, ew—j, out of the wealth component j, with j= equities (EQ), financial wealth (F), non-equities (N-EQ)
and  housing (H).
1) Figures are averages of the estimates given by Ludvigson, Steindel and Lettau (2002) using 5 and 6-variable VARs in levels and in
differences.22
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broadly consistent with the lifetime budget
constraint discussed in Section 2. Amongst
European countries, they are lowest for
Germany (2.0) and France (1.4) and highest for
the United Kingdom (4.9) and Italy (3.0). There
are few indications as to why the MPCs vary
across countries. This appears to be a result of
the pooled estimation techniques, which fixes
the elasticity, instead of the MPC out of wealth
components mpcW-j, to be equal within groups.
Therefore the common elasticity estimated for
France and Italy, for instance, inevitably
implies an MPC out of equity wealth mpcW-EQ in
France that is half that in Italy, since the stock
market capitalisation ratio in France is twice
that in Italy. Ludwig and Sløk’s results may
therefore be more useful for comparing MPCs
across groups than across countries within the
groups. Ludwig and Sløk find clear evidence
that the impact of changes in stock prices on
consumption is bigger in economies with
market-based financial systems than in
economies with bank-based financial systems.
This impact from stock markets to consumption
has increased over time for both groups of
countries.
The effect of housing prices on consumption
has also become more important over time. The
authors consider this change to be a striking
evidence for relevant changes in the mortgage
markets. In the sample period 1985-2000 the
effect of housing prices is significantly
positive and the estimated elasticity is about
twice as large as the elasticity of stock market
prices for the combined sample of all countries
and for the group of market-based economies.
Ludwig and Sløk do not provide an implied
MPC out of housing wealth mpcW-H. Utilising
the information contained in Table 3.1 and
Chart 4.1, the corresponding MPC out of
housing wealth would be around 7.5 cents per
euro for Germany and around 5 cents per euro
for France and Italy. In market-based
economies these estimates would be smaller,
i.e. 1.3 cents per euro for the Netherlands, 1.7
pence per pound for the United Kingdom and 2
cents per dollar for the United States. As well
as grouping countries according to financial
structure Ludwig and Sløk also group their data
according to home-ownership rates. They find
that an increase in the home-ownership rate
increases the probability that a positive wealth
effect will outweigh negative income and
substitution effects on consumption. This
result supports our discussion in sub-section
4.3.2.2.
Bertaut (2002) estimates individual country
regressions for various forms of wealth. He
used both stock price data and disaggregated
household wealth data, to the extent available.
Accordingly, the estimations based on proper
wealth data cover fewer countries, i.e. France,
the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada
and Japan. The MPC out of wealth estimates for
wealth and its components are roughly in line
with those of Ludwig and Sløk (2001), being
slightly lower for the United Kingdom (4.3
pence per pound), but higher for the United
States (5.4 cents per dollar), France (2.7 cents
per euro) and, especially, Canada (8.3 cents per
dollar) and Japan (10.6 yen per 100 yen). The
United States was the only country for which it
was possible to disaggregate wealth into equity
and housing components. The estimated MPC
out of housing wealth was markedly higher (9.7
cents per dollar) than that estimated by Ludwig
and Sløk (2001) and also higher than that out of
equity wealth (6.2 cents per dollar). Reduced-
form equations using equity prices gave
markedly lower elasticities for equity wealth
than those of Ludwig and Sløk (2001) (see
figures in brackets in Table 4.2). Even in the
United States and Canada, where adequate
disaggregated wealth data were available,
these reduced-form estimates imply markedly
smaller impacts of changes in equity wealth on
consumption than corresponding estimates
based on wealth data. This evidence suggests
that estimates based on stock price data contain
a downward bias.
Boone et al. (1998) estimates long-run
consumption function for seven major OECD
countries (the United States, Japan, Canada,
Germany, France, Italy and the United
Kingdom). Due to the lack of adequate wealth23
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data they also use only equity price and housing
price data in estimating consumption responses
to changes in asset values. These estimation
results are well in line with corresponding
estimation results presented by Bertaut (2002).
Accordingly, they may contain a downward
bias.
Labhard, Sterne and Young (2005) presents
estimates of the MPC out of wealth using
estimates of the elasticity of total consumption
with respect to net financial wealth obtained
from simple s tructural VAR (SVAR) models,
including the VAR of Ludvigson, Steindel and
Lettau (2002, LSL in chart 4.2). As Table 4.2
and Charts 4.2 show, their estimates suggest
that the MPC out of wealth is between 1 and 4
cents per euro for most European countries
under review, but with markedly higher values
for Germany (around 8 cents per euro on
average) and negative values for Portugal.12 As
Chart 4.2 shows, the relative size of these
cross-country estimates remains broadly
similar across different specifications of the
VARs.13 Compared to other studies, the
response in Germany seems rather strong.
However, the elasticities for equity wealth will
be significantly modified when the results are
re-scaled for the relative holdings of equity
wealth across countries. Estimated MPCs for
the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada
Chart 4.2 SVAR-based estimates of the long-
run MPC out of net financial wealth
and Japan are higher than in Europe being in the
range of 4 to 8 cents per dollar (or pence per
pound, or yen per 100 yen).
Case et al. (2001) use extensive panel data to
investigate the link between consumption and
increases in housing and equity wealth. They
rely on two bodies of data: (1) a panel of annual
observations covering 14 countries over the
last 25 years and including aggregate
consumption, stock market capitalisation, and
aggregate housing wealth and (2) an analogous
panel of quarterly observations of US states
including consumption, stock ownership, and
aggregate housing wealth. Their main finding
in both data sets is that the housing market
seems to be more important than the stock
market in influencing consumption. The fact
that Case et al. (2001) define their variables in
per-capita terms might help to explain why
stock market wealth is not significant.
Although the stock market had played an
important role in explaining aggregate
consumption, it may not have been as
significant in explaining the behaviour of an
average consumer, as most consumers do not
hold equities and, hence, stock owners are
underrepresented in the sample. Even though
equity ownership has become more
widespread, the distribution of equity holdings
is still fairly skewed (see Table 3.2.3), while
housing wealth is much more evenly
distributed across households.
The estimated elasticity from housing wealth to
consumption is 0.11 to 0.14 in Europe and
0.062 in the United States, when the panel data
of the US states are used. By using the
information contained in Tables 3.1 and Chart
4.1, these elasticities imply that the MPCs out
of housing wealth would be 7.5 to 9.5 cents per
euro for Germany, 5 to 7 cents per euro for
12 The high estimates for Germany may be due to the structural
breaks in the series associated with unification.
13 The variables included are aggregate consumption, income,
inflation, net financial wealth, interest rates, and, in the case
of the 6-variable VAR, commodity prices. Restrictions are
imposed on the short-run responses of variables. In Chart 4.2
we refer to the SVARs as “LSL”, which comes from the names
of the authors who originally used the restrictions in these
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France and Italy and around 4 cents per dollar
for the United States.
Edison and Sløk (2001) investigate stock price
impacts on consumption with a special focus on
the different effect of changes in
telecommunications, media and information
technology (TMT) and non-TMT stocks.
Estimating a reduced-form VAR for seven
OECD countries for 1990s, the empirical
analysis suggest that both TMT and non-TMT
stocks may have a significant impact on
consumption in Canada, the United Kingdom,
and Japan. In the United States the effect on
consumption of a change in non-TMT market
capitalisation was larger than for the TMT
sector, while in continental Europe the impact
of TMT equities on consumption was clearly
dominant.
4.3.2.2 Evidence based on single-country studies
This sub-section reviews single-country
studies. We start with the US evidence because
the bulk of empirical work has been done with
US data.
The US evidence
The role of wealth effects on consumption has
been most extensively studied for the United
States, and this field of research has grown
significantly in recent years. Commonly cited
TMT Non-TMT
Canada 7.3 7.2
United States 1.7 5.1
United Kingdom 2.9 3.4
North America and




Continental Europe average 3.8 1.0
Japan 6.4 13.1
Table 4.3 MPC out of TMT and non-TMT
equities
estimates of the MPC out of wealth in the
United States are typically in the range of 2 to 5
cents increased spending from a dollar increase
in wealth.14 Among other estimates using time-
series consumption, income, and equity wealth
data, Reifschneider, Tetlow, and Williams
(1999) note that in the Board of Governor’s
FRB-US Model, wealth effects from higher
stock prices generate on average about 3½
cents additional consumer spending in the long
run. As shown in Table 4.4, the results reported
by Ludvigson and Steindel (1999) and Mehra
(2001) are in line with earlier estimates.
However, the estimates of Davies and Palumbo
(2001) and, especially, Palumbo et al. (2002)
are somehow higher.
According to these studies the MPC out of total
wealth and its components are markedly higher
than conventional estimates if the income
variable in the estimated equation is measured
in terms of labour income instead of disposable
income. In addition, Palumbo et al. (2002)
remarked that the conventional practice of
deflating income and wealth by a price index




– non-durables 3.8 4.0 4.6
Mehra
Labour income
– non-durables 3 3 3
– total consumption 4 5 4
Davis & Palumbo
Labour income 5.7 8.0 6.3
Disposable income - - 3.9
Palumbo et al.
Labour income:
– scaled non-durables 6.0 11.3 6.9
– total consumption 5.4 10.2 6.1
Disposable income:
– total consumption - - 4.0
Table 4.4 MPC out of equity wealth (W-EQ),
non-equity wealth (W-NEQ) and total
wealth (W)
14 In his February 2000 Monetary Policy Report testimony,
Federal Reserve Board of Governors Chairman Alan
Greenspan noted that “historical evidence suggests that
perhaps three to four cents of every additional dollar of stock
market wealth eventually is reflected in increased consumer
purchases.”25
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scaled version of real consumption of non-
durables and services, is inconsistent. A more
detailed discussion is presented in the
Appendix of this work. Correcting this
incompatibility, which also improved the co-
integration properties of the estimated long-run
equation, resulted in markedly higher estimates
for the MPC out of equity wealth (6.0), non-
equity net worth (11.3) and total wealth (6.9).
However, as discussed in the previous sub-
section, Lettau and Ludvigson (2002) indicated
that if much of the variation in wealth is
transitory and uncorrelated with consumer
spending, then the MPC out of wealth mpcW is
not a good summary statistic for the wealth
effects on consumption. They estimated that as
much as 88% of the variance in wealth is
transitory. If applied to their mpcW value of 4.6,
the implied corrected summary statistic mpccorr,
as shown by equation (2.9), would be 1.2.
However, Palumbo et al. (2002) challenged this
evidence. They argue that the MPC out of
wealth should vary, reflecting variations in the
expected rate of return. Recursive estimations
over the past thirty years indicate that this has
not been the case. Hence the size of the
transitory (mean-reverting) component in
wealth changes remains controversial.
The European evidence
Table 4.5 summarises the estimation results of
individual country studies as well as providing
some information on methodology and data
issues. Depending on the estimation approach,
long-run coefficients are reported for different
wealth components. For Germany, according to
the Deutsche Bundsbank’s macroeconometric
multi-country model (BbkM), the long-run net
financial wealth elasticity is 0.14. The wealth
elasticity reported by the Banque de France
was half of that, at 0.07. Sveriges Riksbank
reports an elasticity for non-human net wealth
of 0.12 (in real terms) in an unpublished study.
This estimate is compatible with the Clapham
et al. (2002) estimates for Sweden, which are in
the range of 0.06 to 0.15, and for Finland, in the
range of 0.07 to 0.014. For Spain, Willman and
Estrada (2002) estimated a wealth elasticity of
0.26, which is broadly in line with Balmaseda
and Tello (2002), with wealth disaggregated
into equity, non-equity financial and housing
wealth. However, a more recent estimate of
wealth elasticity by Estrada et al. (2004) was
much lower at 0.04.17 For the United
Kingdom, the Bank of England reports an
elasticity of 0.06 (single equation response)
and 0.11 (full model response) for net financial
wealth. Belgium estimates a markedly lower
financial wealth elasticity of 0.02 to 0.04.
According to an unpublished analysis, the
long-run elasticity of equity wealth is 0.02 for
Finland, 0.06 for Spain and zero for Sweden,
where equity wealth is limited to market values
of listed shares for Sweden, Spain and Finland.
Reported MPCs out of equity wealth and non-
equity financial wealth were 2 cents per euro
and 7 to 9 cents per euro respectively for
Germany. Reported  (or implied by
corresponding elasticity estimates)  MPCs out
of total physical capital and financial wealth
were 3 cents per euro for Portugal (in 1997 ), 2
to 4 cents per euro for Finland, 4 to 5 öre per
krona for Sweden and 2 pence per pound for the
UK (in 2001). The UK disaggregated
estimations for the MPCs out of net financial
wealth and housing wealth are 4 pence and 2
pence per pound, respectively (March 2002
figures). Italy reported an MPC out of total
wealth in the range of 1.5 to 2.0. Also in the
Banca d’Italia Quarterly Model, where the
MPC out of total wealth depends on the real
interest rate, a value of 1.5 is obtained for a real
interest rate of 2%. With these estimates the
reported MPC was consistently somewhat
higher out of financial wealth (2.7) and
somewhat lower out of housing wealth (1.4).
15 Estrada et al. (2004), in defining nominal total wealth, apply
the Madrid stock index to the volume of total productive
capital, while Willman and Estrada (2000) define this wealth
component at repurchasing prices. The former practice results
in a markedly wider cyclical variation in the wealth-to-
consumption ratio and, hence, in a lower elasticity estimate
than latter practice. However, only a proportion of companies
are quoted in the stock market and only some of the companies
are owned directly by households. Hence, the former practice
tends to result in a downwardly biased and the latter practice
an upwardly biased elasticity estimate.26
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4.4 OVERVIEW OF RESULTS
Some finding based on micro-data evidence
support the existence of a direct wealth effect
on consumption. For instance, Maki and
Palumbo (2001) find that essentially all of the
increased spending observed in the aggregate
data can be attributed to an increase in the MPC
out of income of the richest households.
However, there is no consensus regarding the
size of the MPC out of wealth and its
components. The range of MPC out of wealth
estimates across countries and often also across
studies within the same country is wider than
theory would suggest on the bases of cross-
country differences in wealth composition and
Greece Finland1) Belgium France Germany 7) Italy
Estimation period 61-97 79-98 81-01 78-01 80-03 80-01
Data frequency Q Q Q Q Q Q
Long-run elasticity of current income 0.7-0.94 0.96-0.98 0.74
(proxy for human wealth) 0.4
Long-run elasticity of total non-human net wealth 0.07-0.14 0.07 0.31
(incl. housing)
Long-run elasticity of net financial wealth 0.14
Long-run elasticity of financial wealth 0.02-0.04
Long-run elasticity of equity wealth 0.02 0.01
Long-run elasticity of non-equity net financial wealth 0.08 0.10
Long-run elasticity of non-equity financial wealth
Long-run elasticity of housing wealth 0.05
MPC out of total net wealth 2.1 - 4.1 1.6 4.4 1.5 - 2
MPC out of financial wealth 2.7
MPC out of net financial wealth
MPC out of non-equity net financial wealth 7-9
MPC out of equity wealth 2
MPC out of housing wealth/physical capital 6.8 1.4
Dependent (endogenous) variables6) C C C VECM C
Portugal Nether- Spain Sweden UK UK (full
lands model)
Estimation period 58-97 ? 80-01 79-98 75-01 75-01
Data frequency A Q Q Q Q Q
Long-run elasticity of current income 0.94 0.682) 0.4-0.61)
(proxy for human wealth) 0.744) 0.161)
Long-run elasticity of total non-human net wealth 0.03 0.043) 0.06-0.171)
(incl. housing) 0.264) 0.125)
Long-run elasticity of net financial wealth 0.06 0.11
Long-run elasticity of financial wealth 0.141)
Long-run elasticity of equity wealth 0.062)
Long-run elasticity of non-equity net financial wealth
Long-run elasticity of non-equity financial wealth 0.112)
Long-run elasticity of housing wealth 0.152) 0.051)
MPC out of total net wealth 3 2 7.74) 4 - 55) 2
MPC out of financial wealth
MPC out of net financial wealth 3.7
MPC out of non-equity net financial wealth
MPC out of equity wealth
MPC out of housing wealth/physical capital 1.9
Dependent (endogenous) variables6) CC 4) C C VAR
1) Clapham, Hyytinen and Takala (2002).
2) Balmaseda and Tello (2002).
3) Estrada et al (2004).
4) Willman and Estrada (2002).
5) Sveriges Riksbank.
6) C = private consumption. VAR/VECM = multivariate approach including income and wealth
7) Hamburg, Hoffmann and Keller (2005).
Table 4.5 Individual country (central bank and other) estimates of long-run effects of
financial wealth on consumption27
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demographics. Estimates for the United States
are an exception in that both micro and macro
studies consistently confirm the existence of a
wealth effect on consumption. The range of
MPC out of wealth estimates using US data is
also theoretically feasible. Further, some US
studies find somewhat lower MPC out of equity
wealth than out of non-equity wealth. In
Europe, the German and Italian (panel data)
evidence supports this view.
Typically, MPC out of wealth estimates in
international comparisons have been smaller
for continental EU countries than for the
English-speaking countries. Both cross-
country and single-country studies broadly
support this view. However, this is not
uncontroversial, especially since estimates for
European countries are often smaller than
would seem admissible on theoretical grounds.
Also unlike in most other studies, the MPC out
of wealth estimates presented by Labhard et al.
(2005) stand out as being quite high for
Germany, exceeding their estimates for the
United States. Likewise a reported estimate for
the MPC out of non-equity net financial wealth
was in line with the corresponding US
estimates. In addition, the panel data studies of
Ludwig and Sløk (2002) and Case et al. (2001),
which try to separate equity and housing wealth
effects on consumption, found quite high MPC
out of  wealth estimates for housing wealth in
European countries. Furthermore, Edison and
Sløk (2001) found that consumption in
European countries was more sensitive to
variation in the market value of “New
Economy” stocks than was consumption in the
United States.
Data problems may be a potentially important
source of wide cross-country variation in
estimated MPCs. Data problems are apparent in
many of the studies referred to in this report. In
international comparisons in particular, stock
market capitalisation, stock prices and housing
prices have often been used as proxies for the
level of their respective wealth components.
There are also differences across countries in
the measurement of wealth. Although agreed
guidelines are generally followed, the specific
methodology applied in each country depends
on data availability. As the more detailed
presentation in Appendix 1 shows, the
treatment of sole proprietorships, for instance,
differs in European countries and in the United
States. Methods of estimating the value of
unlisted companies also vary across countries.
4.5 HOW SIGNIFICANT ARE CROSS-COUNTRY
DIFFERENCES IN ESTIMATED MPC OUT OF
WEALTH?
Our analysis suggests that cross-country
comparisons based on empirical estimates of
the MPC out of wealth may be unreliable. We
find it implausible that demographic and
structural differences between countries could
explain cross-country differences in MPC out
of wealth as large as those suggested in the
empirical literature. In contrast, we find good
reasons to believe that data mismeasurement
and structural shocks that vary across time and
across countries may lead to estimates of the
MPC out of wealth that differ widely across
countries. Therefore, we might also expect
empirical estimates of the MPC out of wealth to
be imprecise. Thus despite the apparently large
differences in point estimates of MPC out of
wealth across countries, we may be unable to
reject the hypothesis that such differences are
not significant. Labhard et al. (2005) give
recent evidence on this issue. They apply a
dynamic panel approach recently suggested by
Pesaran et al. (1999). Subject to a specification
in which the parameters can be interpreted as
MPC out of wealth, their pooled mean group
estimator (PMGE) can test cross-country
restrictions on the long-run MPC out of wealth,
while taking into account possible cross-
country differences in the adjustment to this
common long-run MPC out of wealth.
Therefore, a PMGE-based direct estimate of
the MPC out of wealth is likely to provide a
theory-consistent guide to wealth effects on
consumption, and a better guide than estimates
obtained from either traditional panel methods28
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or single equation techniques.16 In this case,
traditional panel methods, including the fixed
and random effect estimators, are overly
restrictive, since they force all coefficients
except the intercepts to be identical across
























































All parameters except the MPC out of wealth
(β) are country-specific. Therefore, the PMGE
provides a means to test the hypothesis that the
MPC out of wealth is identical across
countries. Labhard et al. (2005) estimated the
above equation for the panel of 11 countries.
Their estimate for β is 6.8, which is somewhat
higher than the average of the individual
country estimates (4.8). In addition,
specification test supported the hypothesis that
the MPC out of wealth is equal for all countries
in the panel, although some of the single-
country estimates yielded results which were
not economically sensible.17
4.6 CONCLUSIONS
A number of studies have estimated significant
wealth effects across a very broad range of EU
and non-EU economies.
Wealth-consumption ratios differ markedly
across countries, and, in principle, may provide
an indication of the relative strength of wealth
effects in aggregate and across a range of
assets. However, an important contribution of
this study is to suggest that methodological
differences in compiling household balance
sheet data still remain across countries and they
may have exaggerated the cross-country
differences in wealth-consumption ratios. The
effect of equity price changes on household
wealth in Germany, for example, may be
relatively understated, while those in the
United States may be overstated. Any such
measurement discrepancies will inevitably be
built into model-based estimates of wealth
16 Moreover, due to its flexibility, the PMGE is particularly
suitable for the “large N, large T” case, i.e. when the cross-
sectional and time-series dimensions are both large and
similar in magnitude, as is usually the case in cross-country
studies.
17 Pesaran et al. (1999) have argued that this is one of the
situations in which the PMGE is particularly useful.
effects since models re-value equities
according to published data.
Calibrated theory-based models give a good
benchmark for an expected MPC out of wealth.
For instance, the cross-country estimates of
MULTIMOD are in the range of 5.4 to 8.2 cents
per euro (cents per dollar). Although the
available evidence is rather sparse, MPC out of
wealth estimates based on the direct estimation
of the theory-based equations are well in line
with calibrated estimates, being in the range of
3 to 10 cents per euro (cents per dollar), if the
some highest outlying estimates are excluded.
On the bases of these estimation results, no
clear evidence can be found for MPC out of
wealth being lower in the continental Europe
than in the English-speaking countries.
Individual country studies find elasticities to
total non-human wealth in the range 0.03 to
0.17 for European countries, while the MPC is
in the range of 1.5 to 7.5. Studies which provide
pooled estimates of MPC tend to show higher
values for the United States and the United
Kingdom than for other European countries. On
the other hand, estimates from VAR models
show smaller differences between European
countries, especially Germany, and the United
States. Though many existing empirical studies
estimated plausible MPCs out of financial
wealth, the differences across countries and
across studies for the same country are rather
large. They can only be explained by
combination of factors (different time
horizons, demography, distribution of wealth,
time-varying rates of return) including
inconsistencies in the data that are used.
Interestingly, the panel data estimation
technique, developed by Pesaran (1999), which
is less sensitive to cross-country
incompatibilities in data construction,29
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provided the MPC out of wealth estimate of 6.8
cents per euro, which is comparable with a
typical estimate for the United States. More
importantly, cross-country differences in the
MPC out of wealth estimates were not
statistically significant.
Finally, there is some empirical support for the
hypothesis that housing wealth may have
stronger impact on consumption than equity
wealth in some EU countries, although the
evidence is scarce and inconclusive. But
relatively little cross-country research has been
done to try to study the simultaneous
relationship between asset price and
consumption changes, or how the consumption
response might differ according to the cause of
the shock to equity prices.
5 ASSET PRICES AND INVESTMENT
In addition the effects described above, asset
prices may also have an effect on economic
activity through its effect on investment. In
particular, equity prices may affect corporate
sector investment and house prices may affect
residential investment. This section reviews
the available evidence of asset price effects on
both of these investment components.
5.1 STOCK PRICES AND CORPORATE
INVESTMENT
Share prices may also affect economic activity
by changing the cost of equity capital to finance
corporate investment. Changes in share prices
may also alter the financial structure of the
company, affecting the cost and the availability
of external funds. Finally, changes in share
prices that reflect information about the future
prospects in the economy, may affect
expectations and therefore investment plans.
More formally, the mechanisms described
above are usually classified in the following
three channels:
1. Tobin’s Q or cost-of-capital channel
2. Balance sheet channel
3. Confidence channel
In general, empirical evidence linking share
prices and investment is limited. When the
investment equation accounts for alternative
explanatory variables, share prices still play a
role in explaining investment, but the impact of
cash flow and sales suggest that the balance
sheet channel and the confidence channel may
be more important than the cost of capital
channel.
There are several possible reasons for this
rather weak link between investment and share
prices. First, when share prices are low
companies may substitute debt financing for
equity financing and when share prices are high
companies may use funds obtained by equity
financing to improve their financial structure
or for mergers and acquisitions instead of
investing. Second, response of investment may
depend on the source of a given change in stock
prices. Temporary changes in share prices may
not have the same impact on investment as
changes perceived as permanent. Empirically,
however, it is difficult to establish how
companies perceive movements in the stock
market. In other words, it is difficult to
determine whether share prices reflect the
fundamental value of the company or carry a
speculative component.
Moreover, all these factors will affect
investment simultaneously through the three
channels listed above. While speculative
movements in share prices should not affect
investment through the cost-of-capital
channel, they may have an impact through the
confidence channel. Similarly, while an
increase in share prices may not stimulate
investment through the reduction in the cost of
capital, companies may use equity issues to
improve their financial position, affecting
investment through the balance sheet channel.
In practice it is very difficult to disentangle the
effect of each of these channels on investment,30
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so in the following we concentrate on Tobin’s
Q channel. A separate review on the balance
sheet and confidence channels given in
Appendix 3 suggests that the balance sheet
effect through cash flow may be very
important, in particular for small (and young)
companies. However, given that these
companies are unlikely to be listed on the stock
exchange, it is difficult to identify a direct
effect of stock prices on investment through the
balance sheet. Changes in stock prices may also
be transmitted to investment through the bank-
lending channel. When stock price movements
lead to a deterioration in bank balance sheets,
this reduces their willingness/capability to
lend. Finally, although there seems to be a
close relationship between stock prices and
confidence in the euro area, empirical
estimation of a separate confidence channel on
investment is rather difficult.
5.2 TOBIN’S Q OR COST-OF-CAPITAL CHANNEL
In theory a change in share prices implies a
change in the cost of raising equity capital to
finance corporate investment. This has been
formalised theoretically in Q theory (Tobin,
1969) which describes how movements in stock
prices can affect investment. For example, a
company may perceive the cost of equity
capital to be rather high in periods when the
company’s stock price is low compared to
earnings per share. As a result, companies may
reduce investment in projects previously
perceived as profitable.
According to Tobin’s Q theory, the company
should invest as long as the market value of an
investment exceeds the replacement cost of
that investment. Marginal Q is defined as the
change in the market value of a company
divided by the change in its capital stock
(investment) that caused the change in market
value. If marginal Q is larger than one, the
market price of companies is high relative to
the replacement cost of capital, and new plant
and equipment capital is cheap relative to the
market value of the company. The company can
then issue stocks at a high price relative to the
cost of the facilities and equipment they are
buying. In this case, investment spending will
rise because companies can now buy more new
investment goods with only a small issue of
stock.
Although in practice marginal Q is not
observable, average Q can be expressed as the
market value of the company divided by the
replacement cost of capital. Hayashi (1982a)
proves that under certain conditions average Q
is equal to marginal Q. Therefore, most
empirical studies use average Q and set the
market value of the company at the share price.
An increase in share prices makes it cheaper for
companies to finance their investment because
each share issued yields more funds. Thus, an
increase in stock prices lowers the cost of
capital, stimulating investment. In this theory,
no other variables are needed to explain
investment because all expectations including
future revenue are captured in share prices.







































where  t t K I  is the investment ratio;  t V  is the
fundamental value of the company, given by
the discounted present value of the cash-flow
stream expected from the existing capital
stock; the expression () 1 1 − − t
K
t K p δ  is the
replacement cost in period t of the capital stock
that the company inherits from the previous
period. As mentioned before,  t V  is measured by
the company’s share price.
The theory assumes that stock markets are
strongly efficient, in the sense that the
fundamental value of the company can be
measured by its stock market valuation. Thus,
stock prices should reflect the value of the
company given by the discounted present value
of the cash flow and this should contain all
available information about the company.
Given this assumption, the only information
18 See e.g. Bond and Cummins (2001).31
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necessary to estimate a company’s investment
demand is given by Q. Since information about
the financial structure or expectations about
future revenue should be known, these should
be reflected in share prices.19
However, empirical studies using multivariate
regressions have almost unanimously failed to
find evidence of an effect of share price on
investment expenditure. For example, Tease
(1993) concludes: “When other determinants
of investment are controlled for, share prices
do not seem to explain much of the variation in
investment in any of the G7 countries.”20
Blanchard et al. (1993) and Morck et al. (1990)
also examine the effect of share prices on
investment and report similar results. While
(non-residential) investment expenditure
remains hard to explain, the relative
importance of other key factors is confirmed by
various studies: Chirinko (1993) concludes:
“...output (or sales) is clearly the dominant
determinant of investment spending with user
cost having a modest effect.” Moreover, “the
usefulness of the Q-theory is called into
question by its generally disappointing
empirical performance.”21
Some authors attribute these disappointing
results to the use of share prices as indicators of
the fundamental value of the company when
stock markets are not efficient. There are
several reasons why the valuation of the
company by managers and the market may
diverge:
1. the market may have less information
2. even if the information is the same, the
market may not value assets at their
fundamental value, and the share price may
include a rational speculative bubble
3. the market may be subject to fads that cause
market valuation to deviate from
fundamentals for long periods.
In theory, companies will react only to
permanent changes in share prices and will tend
to ignore movements in share prices that are
considered fads or bubbles.
Thus, some authors have attempted to
distinguish between the components of the
share price that reflect the fundamental value
of the company and the residual speculative
component. Thus the fundamental value of the
company may be expressed as the market value




t V V V − = (5.2)
In the literature, fundamentals have been
proxied by sales, cash flows, dividends, and
analysts’ earnings forecasts, among other
variables.
Blanchard et al. (1990) made one of the first
attempts to perform this decomposition. They
investigated whether managers ignore share
prices when they deviate from fundamentals,
but could not reach a definite conclusion.
While there is no clear evidence of a bubble in
1929, the evidence in 1987 suggests managers
ignored market developments.
Bond and Cummins (2001) constructed a
measure of average Q for a group of US
companies using analysts’ forecasts instead of
share prices. They conclude that stock market
valuations deviate significantly from
fundamental values, rendering share prices
useless to explain investment.
A similar approach was followed by Anderson
and Subbaraman (1996) for Australia. They
estimate the fundamental and speculative
component of share prices and find that the
fundamental component has a stronger
relationship with investment than real share
19 This means that the information provided by the financial
structure of the company and expectations about future
revenue, which are of central importance  for the balance
sheet and confidence channels, should also be captured by
average Q.
20 Tease (1993), p. 58.
21 Chirinko (1993).32
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prices, while the speculative component does
not seem to have any significant effect on
business investment. Evidence for Japan is also
mixed. Goyal and Yamada (2004) find that the
speculative component affects investment
during asset prices booms, while fundamentals
matter more after asset price collapses.
Chirinko and Schaller (2001) use the Q model
to test whether there was a stock market bubble
in Japan in the late 1980’s. Their results
confirm the existence of the bubble and also
that developments in stock prices during this
period affected business investment.
Some authors have also tried to explain the lack
of supporting evidence for the cost of capital
channel by arguing that companies with access
to other sources of funds will not react to stock
prices in the same way as equity-dependent
companies (Baker et al, 2002). However, Goyal
and Yamada (2004) found that bank-dependent
companies in Japan show a stronger reaction to
share prices.
More promising results have been found when
other variables are included in the investment
equation. Even when there is no separation
between speculative and fundamental
components of share prices, the significance of
additional variables in the investment equation
suggests that share prices do not reflect all
companies’ investment opportunities as stated
in the original theory. In other words, this
provides evidence that stock markets are not
highly efficient, or that there are measurement
problems in Q. Some studies using this
methodology are described below.
Ashworth and Davis (2001) estimate
investment equations for the G7 countries
including average Q as well as other financial
variables. Average Q is significant only for
Japan and France.
Audretsch and Elston (2002) estimate an
investment equation for German companies in
which both Q and some financial constraints
are included. Their results show that Q is
significant for two groups of companies: the
smallest and the second-largest companies in
their sample. This partly confirms the findings
of Baker et al (2002) since the smallest
companies may have less access to external
finance from banks. However, it is puzzling
that the largest companies do not react to share
prices while the second-largest do.
Alonso and Bentolila (1992) find that Tobin’s
Q is only partially significant for explaining
fixed capital investment by Spanish industrial
companies. The elasticity of investment to
changes in the stock market is rather low, a
result compatible with Spain’s poorly
developed financial markets at that time.
Sensitivity analyses suggest that estimated
coefficients are not stable, although the
qualitative conclusions are maintained. As is
often found in other studies, the significance of
financial variables, such as internal finance or
cash flow rejects the simplest version of the Q
model – namely that Q is a sufficient statistic
for investment.
Van Ees and Garretsen (1994) consider Tobin’s
Q in studying the effects of liquidity on
investment in a group of Dutch companies.
They also include financial variables such as
cash flow, the stock of liquid assets, and the
working capital. Their evidence corroborates
previous findings that once sales and financial
variables are included in the equation, the
effect of Tobin’s Q on investment is very small
or insignificant. Moreover, these results do not
change when the sample is split according to
company size or dividend pay-out. While the
effect of financial variables depends on
whether companies have close ties with banks,
the small effect of Tobin’s Q on investment is
not affected by the existence of bank lending
relationships.
Assarsson et al (2004) use a neoclassical
investment model extended with installation
costs for capital, agency costs for investment
financing, and the possibility of the company
being output constrained as a framework for an
empirical analysis of investment behaviour in
the Swedish manufacturing industry. Using a33
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multivariate error-correction model on data
covering the time period 1951 to 1995 their
results show that Tobin’s average Q is not the
sole determinant of investment, neither in the
short nor in the long run, and other variables
like real output and capital gearing also affect
investment activity.
5.3 HOUSE PRICES AND HOUSING INVESTMENT
Exactly as in the case of corporate investment,
there should also be a relationship between
Tobin’s Q and residential investment.
According to Tobin’s Q theory, the supply of
houses will increase when it becomes
profitable for a construction company to build
more houses. This will happen when the price
at which the house can be sold is higher than its
constructions costs. This is when Tobin’s Q,
which is the ratio between house prices and
construction costs, is larger than 1. Thus, rising
house prices will be accompanied by an
increase in the supply of houses, i.e. housing
investment. In the long run, however, the
increased supply of houses forces real house
prices to fall and Tobin’s Q to converge back to
unity.
As in the case of corporate investment, Tobin’s
Q for residential investment is not observable
and its calculation poses a number of problems.
The price of houses should take into account
improvements in quality, which are in general
very difficult to measure. In empirical studies
construction cost also poses a problem, so it is
proxied by the deflator for private residential
investment. This measure, however, does not
take into account the cost of land, which may
account between 20 and 40 percent of total
building costs and which has increased even
faster than house prices in some countries.22
Due to the lack of data there are few countries
for which studies have attempted to relate
housing or residential investment to a measure
of Tobin’s Q. Examples of two European
macromodels, which apply the Tobin’s Q
approach are the models of Suomen Pankki,
BOF5 (1999), and Danmarks Nationalbank,
MONA (2003). In both models, but especially
in BOF5, housing investments reactions to real
house prices play a central role in balancing
housing demand and supply. BOF5 simulations
indicate that the elasticity of housing
investment with respect to real housing prices
is about 0.9. These results are close to those
estimated by Kenny (2003) for Ireland, who
found long-run elasticity of housing
investment with respect to real house prices of
around 1.0.
Based on the data of some selected OECD
countries in the period 1980-1999, Girouard
and Blöndal (2001) find strong correlation
(above 0.8) between housing investment and
real house prices in Belgium, Denmark, the
Netherlands and Spain. Only very weak
correlation is found for the larger countries
(United States, Japan, France) and for Norway.
Evidence for Germany is tainted by the lack of
good data for the new Länder. However, this
evidence does not confirm whether there is a
long-term relationship between Tobin’s Q and
private residential investment.
Barot and Yang (2002) analyse house prices
and housing investment in Sweden and the UK.
Their results show that Tobin’s Q “Granger-
causes” housing investment in both countries.
Further, based on the error correction approach
for the sample period 1970-1998, their results
indicate that in the short run Tobin’s Q is
significant only in the United Kingdom, but in
the long run is significant in both countries.
However, as discussed by Muellbauer (2004),
it is a generally accepted view is that the United
Kingdom is a country, where the price
elasticity of the supply of new houses is small,
being close to zero and probably lower than 0.5.
We may conclude that the available evidence
indicates that in many countries housing
investment depend positively on the real price
of housing. However, it is also likely that the
22 OECD (2001).34
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strength of these supply responses vary
markedly across countries.
6 CONCLUSIONS
This report reviews the available theoretical
and empirical evidence regarding asset price
and wealth effects in Europe and some other
major economies. For the most part, the work is
of a stock-taking nature, although some new
and unpublished material is also included in the
analysis. The main focus of this report is on
consumption effects via the wealth channel,
reflecting the bulk of literature on the effects of
asset prices. However, asset price effects on
investment via the Tobin’s-Q channel are also
reviewed. In addition, Appendix 3 reviews
possible asset price effects on private spending
via balance sheet and confidence channels. The
available evidence supports the view that the
wealth channel is the most important of various
channels. There is little empirical evidence
indicating that the Tobin’s-Q, balance-sheet
and confidence channels play any major
independent role in the transmission of asset
price effects to economic activity. The key
findings in more detail are as follows:
– A baseline theoretical analysis revealed
that the size of the wealth effect on
consumption should depend on the
following elements. First, the wealth effect
depends inversely on the length of planning
horizons (expected remaining lifetime) or
the strength of the bequest motive. Second,
the wealth effect depends positively on the
expected risk-adjusted rate of return on
wealth, which in turn depends on the
expected rate of return on wealth and the
subjective discount rate. Higher risk
aversion will move the risk-adjusted rate of
return closer to the expected rate of return
on wealth. Third, if expected returns on
assets vary over time, then the response of
consumption to changes in wealth may
depend on how permanent these changes are
expected to be. For example, an increase in
stock prices that is expected to be followed
by a period of poor returns may have little
effect because a decline in the MPC may
partially offset the higher level of wealth.
Finally, labour income uncertainty implies
that consumers in the upper tail of the
income distribution may have markedly
lower MPC out of wealth than those in the
lower tail of the income distribution.
– Computed examples based on the
intertemporal budget constraint suggest
that reasonable estimates of the MPC out of
wealth might be in the range of 3 to 10 cents
for each one euro permanent increase in
wealth. A natural lower bound for the MPC
out of wealth is the equilibrium risk-free
interest rate (or the subjective discount
rate), but values below that are feasible, if
combined with low (i.e. below one) relative
risk aversion.
– Based on national data sources, the ratio of
gross financial wealth to consumption
expenditure varies markedly across
countries. However, these differences also
reflect differences in statistical and
accounting practices, which weaken the
international comparability of results.
Moreover, stock market capitalisation data
typically used in international comparisons
are subject to even more severe statistical
problems.
– Comparing wealth composition changes
through time and across countries, the
1990s saw a striking increase in the share of
equity holding by households and, in
general, a reallocation of household
financial wealth towards more risky assets
in most countries. However, there are
marked cross-country differences in equity
ownership. In the United Kingdom 23% of
the population own shares (in 2000), in the
United States this proportion is 19% (in
1998), in France it is 13% and in Germany
and Italy it is 10%. There are also striking
cross-country differences in the ratio of
directly held equity wealth to consumption.
In 2000 this ratio was around 200% in the35
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United States, 150% in France, 100-130%
in the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Spain
and Sweden, 90% in the United Kingdom,
50% in Germany and 40% in Austria.
However, in all countries the majority of
equities are owned by households in the
highest income brackets. Moreover, equity
ownership is more common among older
age groups, although more so in the United
States than in continental Europe.
– International comparisons generally reveal
a statistically significant link between
wealth and consumption spending.
However, the implied MPC out of wealth
estimates for EU countries are typically
smaller than those reported for the United
States, although this is not an
uncontroversial result. In particular, panel
data estimation yields a MPC out of wealth
estimate of 6.8 cents per euro, which is
comparable with a typical estimate for the
United States. More importantly, cross-
country differences in MPC out of wealth
estimates were not statistically significant.
– Panel data studies report higher MPC out of
housing wealth in European countries than
in the United States, while the situation is
reversed for the MPC out of equity wealth.
– Regarding country-specific studies the
available econometric evidence on the link
between equity wealth and consumption is
sparse in Europe. Documented, but quite
tentative, elasticities with respect to equity
wealth (with implied MPC out of wealth in
brackets, where available) are 0.01 for
Germany (2 cents per euro), 0.02 for
Finland (1 cent per euro) and around zero
for Sweden. On this basis, a permanent 50%
drop in stock prices would imply a
downward shift in the level of consumption
expenditure of 0.5% in Germany and 1% in
Finland.
– The link between housing wealth and
consumption also seems to be quite
country-specific. For some EU countries
there appears to be little evidence of an
effect on consumption (e.g. Austria,
France, Germany and Italy). This may
reflect cross-country liquidity differences
in housing wealth, but also the fact that
Austria, Germany and Italy are countries
where house prices have been most stable,
which may have made it difficult to identify
the impact of housing wealth on
consumption. In countries where house
prices have been more volatile, a
statistically significant positive effect of
housing wealth on consumption has
typically been found (Finland, Greece, the
Netherlands, Spain and the United
Kingdom). There is some evidence that in
these countries the effects of housing
wealth (and house prices) on consumption
may be stronger than most reported effects
from equity wealth and from financial
wealth more generally.
– The United States provides an important
benchmark because it has high-quality data
sources and has been the subject of most
existing econometric studies. US evidence
provides robust support for the importance
of the wealth channel. In particular, the
preferred estimates of the long-run MPC
out of wealth were in the range of 6 to 7
cents per dollar. The MPC appears to be
somewhat higher for non-equity wealth
(about 10 cents), and somewhat lower for
equity wealth (about 5 cents). Time-
variation in expected returns would imply
variation in the MPC out of wealth.
However, on the basis of the available
evidence it appears that the US wealth
effect on consumption has been relatively
stable over time.
– Regarding the equity price effects on
investment via the Tobin’s-Q channel, a
general conclusion seems to be that equity
prices have no additional explanatory
power once other determinants of
investment, such as sales or cash flow, are
included. Nonetheless, a link from house
prices to residential investment has been36
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identified in many countries. However, the
available empirical evidence is quite sparse
and it may be that the impact of house prices
on residential investment is quite country-
specific, reflecting, for example, cross-
country differences in the transmission of
house prices to construction costs (land
prices) and /or the availability of mortgage
loans.
– Most studies find that the balance sheet
effect, operating through cash flow, seems
to be a very important determinant of
investment, in particular for small (and
young) companies. Given that these
companies are very unlikely to be listed on
the stock exchange, it is difficult to identify
a direct effect of stock prices on investment
through the balance sheet. However,
changes in stock prices may be transmitted
to investment through the bank-lending
channel. This may happen when bank
balance sheets deteriorate as a result of
stock price movements, affecting their
willingness or capacity to lend. Finally,
although there seems to be a close
relationship between stock prices and
confidence in the euro area, the separation
and empirical estimation of the effects via a
confidence channel on investment is rather
difficult.37
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COMPARABILITY OF EQUITY WEALTH DATA
ACROSS COUNTRIES
While much progress has been made in
harmonising methodologies to calculate
financial accounts – at the present time all EU
countries apply criteria laid down in the
European System of Accounts (ESA 95) –
wealth data for international comparison
purposes are still fairly heterogeneous in terms
of the compilation criteria.23 Differences arise
from the concepts themselves, that are not
exactly the same across countries, from the
ways they are measured and from the fact that
the information necessary for applying general
guidelines is not available.
There are many differences in the practical
implementation of the recommendations of
ESA 95 in each country, which affect the
published figures. However, the differences in
the criteria used to obtain the value of
household equity holdings have a greater
influence on wealth figures. The main
differences are the following:
The treatment of sole proprietorships and
partnerships in European countries and the
United States is different. In the US financial
accounts they are considered non-financial
corporations, while in the European countries
they are included in the household sector. As a
consequence, the whole net worth of sole
proprietorships is regarded as household
financial assets in the US methodology, while
in the other countries, part of this amount
(professional buildings, plant and machinery)
is regarded as non-financial assets. Therefore,
it can be said that, in the United States, the ratio
of “shares and other equities” to total assets is
overestimated relative to European countries
and the total amount of financial assets is also
likely to be larger than that which really
pertains to households.
The valuation of equities follows the principles
of ESA 95, which means that marketable
financial instruments are valued according to
their market value. This poses a big problem in
the case of unlisted shares, which are not traded
on organised markets. The general principle of
ESA 95 is to estimate the value of unlisted
shares with reference to the value of listed
shares and to also take into account the sector
and the differences between them due to their
different liquidity and reserves accumulated.
However, the specific estimation method
applied by each country very much depends on
the basic statistics available. Table A.1
summarises these methods in a very synthetic
way for a few countries.
Valuation changes due to exchange rate
movements pose an additional problem for
estimating the value of shares and participation
in foreign companies. Although most of them
are held by domestic firms and not directly by
households, the estimate of their value also
affects the estimated value of domestic
companies, which is part of household equity
holdings. There is no unified criterion
regarding the specific exchange rate to be
applied so each country applies what it
considers to be appropriate. However, the
application of different exchange rate indices
is not neutral and may give rise to very
significant differences in the value of equity
holdings in financial accounts.24
According to Table A.1, France and Spain are
countries that apply market price criteria (more
23 Comments in this appendix are based on Babeau and Sbano
(2002).
24 For example, in Spain there were important revisions of the
estimated market value of shares when the index used as a
reference to estimate value changes due to exchange rate
movements was changed from an effective exchange rate to
several individual currency indices.38
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closely related to stock markets) to a larger
extent. When analysing equity to consumption
ratios (Table A.2), France and Spain have
experienced a relatively large increase in this
ratio in the period 1995-2000, although
increasing equity to consumption ratios are a
common feature across countries. Therefore,
the method applied to estimate the value of
equities across countries appears to have a
significant influence on the changes of the
wealth to consumption ratio over time, though
it is difficult to disentangle this effect from
other effects on the data, such as privatisation.
Section i: Various practices in the valuation method of unlisted companies
Italy The ESA 95 general principle (capitalisation/own funds ratio of quoted companies of a similar size and activity)
is applied for large non-listed companies. For non-listed small to medium-sized companies the valuation applied
is according to their book-value.
Spain Unlisted shares issued by banks are valued by applying the ESA 95 general principle. The value of unquoted
non-financial companies is estimated as the discounted value of the flow of expected ordinary profits. In
practice, the discount rate used is inferred from the valuation of quoted corporations.
France The ratio between the market value of listed companies and their own funds is multiplied by the own funds of
unlisted companies. This procedure is currently under revision.
United Kingdom ESA 95 is applied, but work is still being done on estimates.
Netherlands Unlisted shares are evaluated at own resources.
Germany Unlisted shares (public limited companies) are valued using the market capitalisation of listed companies, with
considerable discounts reflecting the lower ratio of own funds. Unlisted private limited companies are valued
according to their book-value and applying a 30% increase, in order to take into account reserves.
Section ii: Other examples of measurement issues
Belgium Large stocks of government debt may have a relatively large impact on the valuation of household wealth after
adjusting for expected future tax payments.
Germany Data availability of mutual fund equity holdings, insurance company accounting practices.
United States Different sector definition in US flow of funds accounts: 1. narrow definition: household sector does not include
self-employed;1) 2. broad definition: household sector includes self-employed and non-corporate firms.
Table A.1 Data issues in measuring wealth




Spain 0.46 1.08 0.62
France 0.64 1.54 0.91
United Kingdom 0.60 0.90 0.29
Netherlands 0.96 1.29 0.33
Germany 0.29 0.48 0.19
1) Equity is defined here as shares and other equity directly
held by the household sector.
Table A.2 Equity to consumption ratios1)39
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APPENDIX 1
AT BE FI FR DE IT NL PT SP SE UK US JP AU CA
National sources 2000 2001 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
Gross financial Wealth 236 539 302 414 304 386 596 312 320 311 502 525 493
Directly held equities 40 121 189 154 48 107 129 73 108 97 90 196 42
Of which
quoted 44 37 52 126 39
unquoted  77 11 38 70 3
Mutual funds 9 80 7 36 34 65 26 40 40 26 49 0
Pensions and life
Insurance 72 90 84 47 321 43 41 265 150 139
Cash and Deposits 140 110 104 93 112 145 116 100 64 264
Other 125 23 35 73 35 25 16 21 66 48
Financial liabilities (Eurostat) 70 83 66 84 126 50 170 127 100 102 116
Measures of total financial wealth (FW) from other studies
Byrne and Davis (2003)
Gross financial wealth as percentage
of GDP in 2000 229 168 225 300
Bertaut (2002)
Gross financial wealth in 1998 340 240 370 600 230 480 520 460 250 380
NIGEM
Net financial wealth in 2002 Q3 250 150 270 270 370
Measures of stock market wealth from other studies
Byrne and Davis (2003)
Household sector equity wealth 110 45 69 159
Bertaut (2002)
Stock market capitalisation
as percentage of GDP in 2001 89 59 48 148 114 153 130 62 103 90
Table A.3 Financial assets held by household sector, measured as percentage of consumption
(unless otherwise indicated)40
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APPENDIX 2
THE US EVIDENCE ON WEALTH EFFECTS ON
CONSUMPTION
This section reviews the evidence of the effect
of movements in asset wealth on US
consumption. The US economy provides a
particularly good “laboratory” for testing
hypotheses about the relationships between
asset prices and consumer spending because of
the existence of the detailed quarterly Flow of
Funds Accounts which provide a
comprehensive picture of the aggregate
balance sheet of the US household sector; the
United States also has a number of useful
sources of detailed micro-level information on
household patterns of consumption and asset
holdings.
This appendix first presents some estimates
from aggregate regressions designed to
estimate the MPC out of financial wealth and to
review why various empirical studies have
tended to arrive at different estimates of this
parameter. Evidence from some studies based
on micro-data is then briefly reviewed.
A2.1. Aggregate time series evidence
Empirical estimates of macroeconomic wealth
effects have generally taken the aggregate
budget constraint as their starting point, and
then made a couple of simplifying assumptions
regarding preferences and asset returns.  For
example, the most common applications of the
permanent income hypothesis (PIH) usually
assume that the rate of return on assets is
constant. This assumption simplifies the
aggregate budget constraint as
(A2.1)    [] t t t t C Y A r A − + + = + ) 1 ( 1 .
Repeated substitution of this expression yields
a standard expression for the intertemporal
budget constraint:





















Finally, a structural “consumption function”
linking consumption to wealth and income is
derived by making some assumptions about the
expected evolution of consumption. For
example, Robert Hall’s (1978) seminal
contribution assumed that consumers had
quadratic utility and a discount rate equal to the
rate of return on assets. This yielded the
prediction that consumption should follow a
random walk. Replacing all future expected
values of consumption with today’s value and
re-arranging we get the most common
“structural” form of the PIH:
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This specification implies that households
consume a constant proportion, r
r
+ 1 , of their
total wealth, defined as the sum of current
financial assets plus the discounted sum of
current and expected future labour income.25
A re-formulation of this equation that has been
used to estimate the MPC out of household
wealth expresses the relationship in ratio form
as















where t is a mean-zero term reflecting current
expectations about deviations of future labour
income growth from its average levels.  Note
that we are referring to Y as labour income to
be consistent with the underlying budget
constraint. Capital income is reflected in the
budget constraint as the rate of return times the
stock of invested assets, i.e. as  [] t t t C Y A r − + .
Figure A2.1 shows the fit of a simple ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression for US quarterly
data based on equation (A2.4), i.e. of a
regression of the consumption to labour income
ratio on a constant and the wealth-to-labour
income ratio. The figure shows that movements
25 It should be noted that the prediction that households consume
a constant proportion of total wealth is more robust to other
assumptions about preferences than quadratic utility,
although the exact formula here for the MPC out of wealth is
specific to these preferences.41
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in wealth appear to explain most of the long-run
swings in the consumption to income ratio: the
adjusted R2 for this regression is 0.77. Charts of
this sort have been used in a wide range of
studies to illustrate how the growth in wealth in
the 1990s is a likely candidate for the
substantial decline in the US saving rate over
this period.
Table A2.1 reports some more details behind
this regression, along with estimates from other
implementations of this regression equation.
All of the regressions employ an updated
version of the quarterly dataset used in
Palumbo, Rudd, and Whelan (2002). In each
case the measure of asset wealth is total
household net worth from the Flow of Funds
Accounts (excluding the stock of consumer
durables) as measured at the end of the previous
quarter.26
26 The standard assumption about the budget constraint made in
deriving consumption functions is that the consumption series
in the budget constraint corresponds to total consumption
expenditure. This implies that expenditure on durables is not
considered asset accumulation in this case, and so theoretical
consistency suggests that it should be excluded from the
measure of wealth.
Fig. A2.1 The effect of wealth on US
consumption
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The first row of the table shows that the
estimate of the MPC out of wealth generated by
the regression illustrated in Figure A2.1 is 6.1
cents per dollar of wealth. The second row uses
a slightly different methodology: It replaces
total consumption with a scaled-up version of
consumption of non-durables and services.
This approach is commonly taken in empirical
consumption studies on the grounds that
theories of short-run consumption dynamics
apply best to a flow measure of consumption.
This approach yields a relatively similar fit to
the regression using total consumption, but has
a slightly higher estimate of the MPC out of
wealth of 6.9 cents per dollar. A number of
aspects of these results are worth noting.
Deflation: The budget constraints – equations
(A2.1) and (A2.4) – are each understood to be
formulated in terms of real consumption, assets,
income, and asset returns, i.e. each of the
nominal variables in the nominal budget
constraint have been deflated by the price index
for total consumption. Because of this deflation
by a common price index, the ratios of real
variables in equation (A2.4) are identical to the
ratios of the corresponding nominal variables.
The regression in the second row (labelled
“Method 1”) follows this logic by replacing
nominal consumption expenditures with a
scaled version of nominal consumption of non-
durables and services. This is the approach taken
Standard errors in parentheses
Income Measure Consumption measure α α α α α µ µ µ µ µ Adjusted R2
Labour income Total consumption 0.84(0.03) 0.061 (0.005) 0.77
Labour income Scaled non-durables and services (Method 1) 0.79(0.03) 0.069 (0.005) 0.74
Labour income Scaled non-durables and services (Method 2) 0.98(0.07) 0.041 (0.012) 0.26
Disposable income Total consumption 0.72(0.01) 0.040 (0.003) 0.70










C + + =
Note: Sample is 1952:2 to 2002:2. See text for descriptions of Method 1 and Method 2.42
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by Palumbo, Rudd, and Whelan (2002). This
method will provide an accurate approximation of
the true relationship as long as the ratio of nominal
consumption of non-durables and services to total
nominal consumption expenditures is stable;
Palumbo, Rudd, and Whelan (2002) show that
this is the case for US data.
In contrast, however, many studies estimate
consumption functions by continuing to deflate
income and wealth by a price index for total
consumption expenditure, but using a scaled
version of real consumption of non-durables
and services, so that consumption, income and
assets are no longer all deflated by a common
price index. Palumbo, Rudd, and Whelan show
that this approach will only be accurate if the
ratio of real consumption of non-durables to
real consumption expenditure is stable, and
that this assumption provides a very poor
description of US data. They show that the total
real US consumption expenditure has risen
sharply over the post-war period relative to real
consumption of non-durables and services.
This implies that an empirical implementation
of equation (A2.4) using this approach will
suffer from significant approximation error and
that this error will tend to increase over time,
probably resulting in downward bias and
instability in the estimated parameters. The
third row of Table A2.1 (labelled “Method 2”)
shows that this approximation method does
indeed result in a much poorer fit than the
method based on nominal ratios, with the
adjusted R2 dropping to 0.26.
Size of the MPC: Another interesting aspect of
the regressions reported in the first two rows of
Table A2.1 is that the size of the estimated
MPC out of wealth, in the 0.06 to 0.07 range, is
somewhat larger than has been reported in
some other studies. For example, in a brief
review of macroeconomic estimates, Poterba
(2000) concludes that “values as high as 0.05
probably represent the upper range of the
current estimates.”
There appear to be two explanations for the
higher estimates of the MPC reported here and in
Palumbo, Rudd, and Whelan (2002). The first is
that many other studies have replaced total
consumption expenditure with consumption of
non-durables and services using the Method 2
approach just described. Because this approach
adds a highly inaccurate approximation error to
equation (A2.4), it is hardly surprising that it
results in downward-biased estimates of the
MPC: Table A2.1 reports that this method
produces an MPC of 0.041.
The second explanation is that some other
studies have used disposable income instead of
labour income in their empirical estimation. As
noted above, this approach is inconsistent with
the theory underlying the relationships
between consumption, income and wealth:
Essentially, it represents a double-counting of
the effects of capital income. And, as shown in
the fourth row of Table A2.1, this approach also
results in a lower estimate of the MPC of
exactly 0.04. Note that if we use the slightly
shorter sample employed in Davis and Palumbo
(2001), this exercise can exactly replicate their
preferred estimate of the MPC of 0.039.
Upward bias (direct/indirect effects):
Another issue that has been discussed in the
literature on wealth effects concerns the
potential correlation of wealth with the error
term in the consumption regression. Poterba
and Samwick (1995) phrase this debate as
relating to whether estimated MPCs out of
wealth reflect a direct effect of wealth on
consumption or indirect effects resulting from
the correlation of wealth with other
unobservable variables influencing
consumption. However, in terms of the
framework underlying equation (A2.4), it does
not appear that this problem represents a major
source of bias in the estimates on the first two
rows of Table A2.1. Theoretical considerations
imply that the error in this regression relates to
current expectations concerning future growth
in labour income. This implies that estimates of
the wealth effect will tend to be biased upwards




t , tends to
positively predict future increases in labour
income. However, regressions with our US43
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quarterly dataset failed to uncover evidence
that the wealth to income ratio “Granger-
causes” labour income growth, so concerns
over upward bias and “indirect effects” may be
somewhat overstated.
Levels versus logs: Another specification
issue is that the regressions in Table A2.1
estimate the MPC out of wealth, whereas a
number of other studies (for example, Brayton
and Tinsley, 1996, and Ludvigson and
Steindel, 1999) estimate log-linear
relationships between consumption, income,
and wealth. These studies often translate their
elasticity coefficients into estimated MPCs
using sample averages of the wealth-to-income
ratio. However, given the wide variations over
time in the wealth-to-income ratio, and the
theoretical priors indicating the superiority of
direct estimation of the MPC, these log-linear
estimates should probably be considered
somewhat unsatisfactory.
Variable expected rates of return: We noted
in deriving equation (A2.4) that this




+ 1 , of their wealth
depended on the assumption that the rate of
return is constant. As Lettau and Ludvigson
(2001) have stressed a more general approach,
in which expected returns on assets are allowed
to vary over time, predicts that the MPC out of
wealth should move positively over time with
expected future rates of return on assets. Thus,
for example, if stock prices fall today because
of a rise in the required equity premium,
consumption need not decline because an
increase in the MPC out of wealth may offset
the decline in wealth itself.
While these ideas – that the MPC out of wealth
may vary over time, and that consumption may
react differently to asset price movements
depending on their source – are intriguing and
theoretically well-founded, at this point the
empirical evidence for their relevance for the
aggregate wealth effect on consumption is
unclear. One interesting piece of evidence is
the finding of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) that
a proxy for the (unobservable) ratio of
consumption to total wealth (human plus
tangible) appears to have forecasting power
both for stock returns and for the excess returns
of stocks over short-term bonds.
This result, however, provides us with little
clue as to how important potential variations in
expected returns may be in generating changes
over time in the MPC out of wealth. On this
issue, Figure A2.2 suggests that (despite the
theoretical likelihood of variations over time in
the  MPC) the estimated wealth effect is
actually quite stable. The figure shows
recursive estimates of the regression reported
on the second row of Table A2.1, i.e. it reports
estimates from rolling regressions which add a
data point for each period. Such regressions are
often used as a diagnostic technique for
uncovering parameter instability. The chart
shows, however, that the estimated MPC from
aggregate US data does not appear to have
changed greatly over the past thirty years.27
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27 This stability over time of the estimated MPC contrasts
markedly with the conclusions of Ludvigson and Steindel
(1999), who argue that the estimated wealth effect varies
substantially over time. The principal reason for this
difference is Ludvigson and Steindel’s use of real
consumption of non-durables together with measures of real
income and wealth obtained by deflating by a price index for
aggregate consumption. As discussed in the text, this
approach adds a large and trending approximation error and so
should be expected to produce unstable parameter estimates.
Their study also adopts a log-linear specification in contrast
to the linear specification estimated here.44
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Estimates of the MPC using shorter moving-
sample windows display somewhat more
variation over time, as would be expected, but
there is limited evidence that these variations
are related to changes in expected returns on
financial assets. For example, Whelan (2003)
shows that the MPC out of wealth does not
appear to vary significantly over time due to
fluctuations in dividend-price ratios, earnings-
price ratios, yields spreads or other variables
that have been considered useful predictors of
financial asset returns. On balance, then, it
appears that the jury is still out on the empirical
importance of fluctuations in expected returns
for the wealth effect.
Differences in MPCs across assets: Finally,
Table A2.2 reports estimates from regressions
that allow the MPC out of equity wealth to be
different from that out of other wealth, i.e. it
reports estimates of
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where e denotes equity wealth and o denotes
other wealth. The table repeats a result reported
previously in a number of studies (for instance,
Brayton and Tinsley, 1996, and Davis and
Palumbo, 2001) which is that the MPC out of
equity wealth appears to be smaller than that
out of other wealth. In fact, these results
suggest that the MPC out of equity wealth is
only about half that out of other wealth. Such a
prediction cannot be derived from the type of
“representative agent” models usually used in
macroeconomics. However, it seems possible
that these differences in the MPC across asset
classes may reflect distribution issues. Equity
wealth is more likely to be held by richer
Standard errors in parentheses
Income measure Consumption measure µ µ µ µ µe µ µ µ µ µo Adjusted R2
Labour income Total consumption 0.054 (0.002) 0.102 (0.004) 0.87
Labour income Scaled non-durables and services (Method 1) 0.060 (0.002) 0.113 (0.005) 0.83
Table A2.2 Empirical estimates of equation (A2.5) for US data
Note: Sample is 1952:2 to 2002:2. See text for descriptions of Method 1 and Method 2.
households, and studies have traditionally
shown that such households have higher saving
rates.45
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The balance sheet channel stresses the
potential impact that the quality of a company’s
balance sheet may have on investment
spending decisions. A rise/fall in asset prices
will improve/weaken the balance sheet
position of a company, thus increasing/
reducing its ability to directly fund projects or
provide collateral for external finance. In both
cases, the risk that lenders face is reduced/
increased and the availability of credit
increases/reduces. The importance of the link
between balance sheet positions and
investment can be seen in the slow recovery of
the economy in many OECD countries from the
1990/91 recession. A number of analysts28 have
attributed the slow recovery, in part, to the
corporate sector’s attempt to improve weak
balance sheet positions coming from heavy
corporate debt burden.
The recent literature on this channel builds on
the theory of capital market imperfections such
as asymmetric information and agency costs.
The basic argument is that asymmetric
information between lenders and borrowers
induces a cost premium for funds raised
externally in comparison to internal funds. This
premium, called the external finance premium,
reflects lenders’ expected costs of monitoring
and evaluating the quality of the company’s
investment opportunities, costs resulting from
the fact that the borrower inevitably has better
information than the lender or distortions in the
borrower’s behaviour coming from moral
hazard. As a result, the cost of external finance
(debt, equity) may be substantially higher than
the cost of internal finance (cash flows,
liquidity).
The balance sheet channel (often called the net
worth channel) is based on the idea that the
borrower’s external finance premium depends
on his financial position. In particular, many
related studies focus on the borrower’s net
worth – defined as the borrower’s liquid assets
plus collateral value of illiquid assets – as a
main state variable: the greater the level of net
worth of the potential borrower (or,
equivalently, the level of company’s internal
financing) the lower will be the premium on
external finance. Shocks that affect net worth
can be an initiating source of real fluctuations,
through two transmission mechanisms:
i) One mechanism arises mainly from changes
in cash flows. A negative shock reduces
current output, lowers cash flows, and
raises the company’s need for external
funds. Consequently, the expected agency
cost and external finance premium rise, thus
deferring investment and reducing output
and cash flows in subsequent periods.
ii) The other mechanism operates through
asset prices and the value of the collateral.
The availability of credit for companies
depends on the value of their assets. Here,
an adverse shock reduces asset prices and
the value of the collateral provided for
loans, thus raising external finance
premium and reducing investment.
An extensive part of the literature refers to the
amplification and propagation of initial real or
monetary shocks brought about by worsening
credit market conditions (as reflected in
borrowers’ balance sheet positions), a
phenomenon called the financial accelerator.
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) develop an RBC
model in which the evolution of companies’ net
worth plays a critical role in macroeconomic
dynamics, opening a channel through which the
borrower’s balance sheet position affects
investment and output. A key virtue of this
model is the inverse relationship between the
potential borrower’s wealth and the expected
agency costs of the lender-borrower
relationship, as described earlier. In this
model, shocks to the economy are amplified
28 Bernanke and Lown (1991), pp. 206 and 211-212, and Tease
(1993), p. 47.46
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and propagated through their impact on
borrowers’ cash flows. An adverse exogenous
productivity disturbance, for example, lowers
current cash flows (income), reducing the
ability of the company to finance investment
with internal funds. Lower entrepreneurial
wealth raises the external finance premium,
thus impairing investment. Declining
investment lowers economic activity and cash
flows in subsequent periods, thus inducing a
persistent investment downturn. An
implication of this model is that the dynamic
effects of such shocks may be asymmetric;
specifically, the weaker the initial financial
condition of the borrower, the more powerful is
the propagation effect through cash flows.
Additionally, during recessions, there is a
reallocation of credit funds from low net worth
to high net worth borrowers.
Apart from the changes in cash flows,
variations in real and financial asset prices are
a major channel for shocks to the net worth. In
this direction, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
develop a dynamic equilibrium model in which
durable assets (land) are not only factors of
production, but they also serve as collateral for
loans. In their model, a small negative
temporary shock to productivity lowers the
value of the collateralised asset. This leads to
tightened borrowing constraints and cutting
backs on investment spending. The fall in
spending lowers the value of existing assets
and leads to a new round of reduced borrowing
and spending, thus propagating the initial
shock further through time. A key point of this
study is the dynamic interaction between credit
limits and asset prices, which turns out to be a
powerful transmission mechanism by which
the effects of shocks persist, amplify, and
spread out.
Bernanke et al. (1999) develop a dynamic
general equilibrium model, which exhibits a
financial accelerator framework. The key
innovation on investment is the relationship:
(A3.1)   {} () 1 1 1 1 + + + + = t t t t
K
t R K Q N s R E
Where  {}
K
t R E 1 +  is the expected return on capital;
() s  is a function of the ratio of the cost of
external finance to the riskless rate, or external
finance premium;  1 + t N  represents net worth;
1 + t tK Q  are total financing requirements; and
1 + t R  shows the opportunity cost of capital.
This expressions state that, in the presence of
capital market imperfections, the premium on
external funds depends inversely on the share
of the company’s capital investment financed
by its own net worth, as measured by the ratio
() 1 1 + + t t t K Q N .
Figure A3.129 relates the cost of funds to the
level of investment of the company,
demonstrating these effects. For financing
requirements, up to point F, the company can
use its own net worth (internal funds). The cost
of these funds is r1, which is the sum of the risk-
free rate and a risk adjustment factor for the
company. Without asymmetric information,
external funds would also be available for the
company at the rate r1. However, asymmetric
information means that, beyond F, the company
acquires external funds at a premium above r1.
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The premium increases with the level of total
finance raised externally, since higher debt
means increased moral hazard and default
risks. This link accounts for the upward slope
of S1. In addition, the external premium
increases with the level of the risk-free rate, as
an increase in the interest rate lowers the
present discounted value of the borrower’s
collateral and reduces the current cash flow,
worsening the moral hazard problem. In Figure
A3.1, an increase in the interest rate shifts the
finance supply schedule from S1 to S2 (which is
steeper than S1’). The consequent fall in
investment (from I1 to I2 rather than I1’) is
magnified by the increase in the external
finance premium. This example illustrates the
potential link between investment demand and
changes in net worth, implying that companies
that can provide a higher collateral or finance a
greater proportion of investment with internal
funds will be likely to face a lower external
finance premium.
A3.2 EXISTING EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
A large part of the literature provides evidence
that company investment is a function of
liquidity and the quality of a company’s
balance sheet, as implied by the financial
accelerator mechanism. A common perception
is that differences in investment behaviour
between companies should come from their
respective access to capital markets.
Generally, it has been found that investment is
quite sensitive to financial variables like cash
flows or the stock of liquid assets for those
companies that face financial constraints. In
these studies, the size of the company is widely
considered as a proxy for capital market access,
though other criteria such as the age of the
company, the dividend pay-out or the coverage
ratio are also used for this reason. Small
companies are considered more likely to be
affected by the balance sheet channel given
their overall lower level of assets and the
higher collateral requirements for loans (due to
higher informational asymmetries).
Consequently, a balance sheet weakening (e.g.
due to a monetary policy tightening) might
lower significantly the value of their collateral,
thus leading to restricted credit access.
Fazzari et al. (1988) use data from US
manufacturing companies for the period 1970-
1984 to study the effect of cash flows on
investment spending. They divide their sample
based on the dividends to income ratio.
Consistently with their perception, their results
also show that the investment of companies
which are believed a priori to be credit
constrained (low-dividend companies) is more
sensitive to fluctuations in their cash flow than
high-dividend companies.
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) used quarterly
time series data for all US manufacturing
companies, classified by size, to examine the
response of small versus large companies to
monetary tightening. They find that small
companies account for a significant part of the
consequent total manufacturing decline and
that they play a prominent role in the slowdown
of inventory investment. Looking for
asymmetric effects, they find that the effects of
monetary policy changes are greater on small-
company variables during recessions (low-
growth states). Their evidence also suggests
that the coverage ratio (cash flows to interest
expenses, an indicator of balance sheet quality)
is positively related to inventory investment
for small companies, but not for large
companies.
Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) use Quarterly
Financial Report data for the US manufacturing
sector and divide companies into two classes:
small and large companies. Their results show
that after a monetary contraction, the
association between cash flow (internal funds)
and investment tightens significantly for small
companies. In contrast, for large companies
there was no change in this relationship.
In another paper, Guariglia (1998) uses data
from a large panel of UK manufacturing
companies for the period 1968-1991 to study
the linkage between internal finance and
inventory investment that appears to play an48
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 29
June 2005
important role in business cycles. Companies
are classified into more likely and less likely to
be financially constrained in terms of the
coverage ratio that is used as a proxy of the
external finance premium. The author
estimates several equations for inventory
investment growth that include the coverage
ratio or cash flows as explanatory variables for
each group of companies. The results suggest
that there is a significant link between the
financial variables and inventory investment,
stronger for companies with weak balance
sheets, during recessions and periods of tight
monetary policy.
Vermeulen (2000) uses the BACH-database for
10 manufacturing industries for the period
1983-1997 to study the presence of a financial
accelerator in Germany, France, Italy, and
Spain. He proxies the “weak balance sheet”
term by using four different indicators: total
debt as a fraction of total assets (leverage),
short-term debt to current assets (liquidity),
short-term debt as a fraction of total debt
(market access) and the coverage ratio (credit
worthiness). The results confirm the
expectation that small company investment
shows greater sensitivity to weak balance sheet
positions, though there is no evidence that this
effect increases during a downturn. Medium-
sized companies are found to be influenced by
balance sheet variables during downturns,
rather than outside downturns. For large
companies there is no evidence of an
accelerator at all. Regarding country
differences in the strength of the financial
accelerator, the estimations show that balance
sheet effects in downturns are stronger in
France and Italy than in Germany and Spain.
Chatelain et al. (2001) use large company
databases for Germany, France, Italy, and
Spain for the period 1985-1999 to investigate
the interest rate channel and the broad credit
channel in the four larger euro-area countries.
Standardised neo-classical investment
regressions were used, in which investment is a
function of sales, cash flow, and the user cost of
capital. The authors find that in all these
countries investment is quite sensitive to user
cost, sales, and cash flow movements. They
also find that only in Italy do smaller
companies show greater sensitivity to cash
flow movements (balance sheet conditions),
although they argue that classification by size
might not be a sufficient indicator for all
countries.
Van Ees and Garretsen (1994) study the link
between liquidity (internal funds) and business
investment for a number of Dutch non-
financial companies. Their estimations suggest
that liquidity is of significant importance for
Dutch business investment and that this impact
is stronger than that found in related studies for
the United States, the United Kingdom and
Japan. With respect to the criteria used to deal
with asymmetric information, the dividend
policy, the size and the age of the companies do
not seem to be important. However, the
existence of close ties between banks and
companies, which mitigates information
problems, turns out to be very significant for
the investment of Dutch companies. In a later
study, Van Ees et al. (1998) also examine how
debt constraints influence corporate
investment of a panel of Dutch companies.
They provide evidence that financial
constraints influence the investment behaviour
of these companies and show that such
constraints are especially relevant for
companies with low dividend pay-outs, while
there was no similar evidence for smaller
companies and the leverage criterion gave
mixed results.
A number of related papers30 provide evidence
for single euro area countries regarding the
existence of a balance sheet (credit) channel as
well as distribution effects across companies.
For France (Chatelain and Tiomo, 2001), the
existence of this channel is confirmed for
companies facing a high risk of bankruptcy,
companies in the equipment goods sector and
companies using trade credit extensively, all of
30 Research conducted within the Monetary Transmission
Network.49
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which present high cash-flow sensitivity. For
Italy (Gaiotti and Generale, 2001), the results
also show that all financial variables (cash
flow, stock of liquidity) affect investment
decisions. This impact is found to be stronger
for small companies and for companies with a
higher share of intangible assets, which are
difficult to evaluate and cannot be used as
collateral. For Germany (von Kalckreuth,
2001), financially constrained companies,
proxied in terms of lower-rated companies, are
found to be more sensitive to financial
variables. However, the sample split according
to size presents no such sensitivity, possibly
indicating the role of the house-banking
system31 in Germany. Here, the balance sheet
channel seems to be of secondary importance
compared to the interest rate channel. For
Austria (Valderrama, 2001), the results support
the existence of a credit channel as well as of
heterogeneity across groups of firms. The
liquidity ratio appears to be the most
significant determinant of investment, though
companies with a close relationship with a
house bank are likely to become less dependent
on internal funds. For Belgium (Butzen et al.,
2001), the evidence supports the hypothesis of
a credit channel as well as of distribution
effects among companies of different size and
sector. For Luxembourg (Lünnemann and
Mathä, 2001), the idea that the strength of a
company’s balance sheet influences
investment behaviour is also confirmed. Young
companies seem to be more financially
constrained, as their investment is more
sensitive to changes in internally generated
liquidity.
A3.3 CONFIDENCE CHANNEL
Stock market volatility may have indirect
effects on the real economy through its impact
on consumer and business confidence. A fall
(rise) in stock prices may signal poor (good)
economic prospects, altering market
participants’ assessments of economic risks.
Consequently, their incentive to spend will be
reduced (increased), thus affecting
consumption and corporate investment. For
example, a large fall in stock prices may force
companies, even those that have not issued
stocks, to revise their profit expectations and
reduce or postpone investment. In addition,
falling stock prices and weak business
confidence may increase investors’ risk
aversion. Investors may subsequently reduce
their holdings in risky assets and ask for higher
risk premiums, which may be passed on to
business in terms of higher interest rates and
lower equity prices, with a negative impact on
investment.32
31 This refers to the establishment of a long-term lending
relationship between a company and a bank, called the house
bank. This practice may help companies overcome liquidity
constraints, thus weakening the balance sheet channel.
32 IMF, World Economic Outlook, December 2001.
Figure A3.2 Industrial production1 and
industrial confidence2 in the euro area
Sources: European Commission Business and Consumer
Surveys and ECB.
1) Annual percentage changes, excluding construction.
2) Percentage balances, seasonally adjusted.
This channel is consistent with the forward-
looking nature of stock prices and their leading
indicator property for real economic activity
that has been empirically found for the euro
area. As stock prices reflect market
participants’ expectations for future corporate
earnings, which are closely related to economic
activity, stock prices help predict future
economic growth.
While the potential mechanism of a confidence
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assessment of this effect is rather complicated.
This is because confidence is a feeling and not
an action, which is difficult to assess
quantitatively. Generally, confidence is
measured by surveys that include questions on
the assessment of current conditions and future
expectations. Several of the constructed
indicators have been found to possess good
leading indicator properties for the business
cycle and can be considered as adequate for
research on macroeconomic issues.
Figure A3.2 depicts industrial confidence and
industrial production for the period 1999-2002
in the euro area. In particular, industrial
confidence is found to be closely linked to the
business cycle component (industrial
production) (correlation = 0.93).
Figure A3.3 depicts the development of the
EuroStoxx broad index, industrial confidence
and consumer confidence in the euro area for
the same period. In several periods confidence
follows similar patterns to the stock price
measure (with high positive correlation in both
cases). In particular, the turning points of the
stock market index tend to lead the turning
points of confidence, showing that stock prices
and confidence co-move quite closely
Figure A3.3 Dow Jones EURO STOXX Broad1,
industrial and consumer confidence2 in the
euro area
Sources: European Commission Business and Consumer
Survey and ECB.
1)  Monthly averages.
2) Percentage balances, seasonally adjusted.
(especially in the case of industrial
confidence).
Arnold et al. (2002) and Jansen and Nahuis
(2003) confirm the predictive power of share
prices for confidence indicators. They find that
equity prices lead confidence indicators in a
large number of European countries and the
United States. This link, however, may simply
reflect more direct wealth and cost of capital
effects and does not necessarily imply a causal
relationship between stock prices and
confidence.
Jansen and Nahuis (2003) find empirical
support for causality from stock market to
confidence. They also suggest that this
relationship is driven by expectations about
economy-wide conditions rather than personal
finances and that the confidence channel is a
separate transmission channel and not an
adjunct to conventional wealth effects. This
conclusion may hold for studies based on
micro-level data, although, in the case of
aggregate time-series data, the estimation of
wealth effects also reflects expectations about
the future.
In this context, confidence could be a catalyst
for an impact from stock prices on consumption
and investment spending. It is, however,
difficult to disentangle empirically the relative
indirect impact of confidence on actual
spending behaviour. In this regard, Figure A3.4
depicts industrial confidence in relation to
investment growth, suggesting that there were
periods when investment growth did not follow
significant movements in industrial
confidence.
Impulse response analysis (by the ECB) of the
relationship between stock prices and
confidence indicators, indicates that the effect
of stock price changes is reflected after some
time in confidence indicators and dies out only
after several years. The effects on industrial
confidence appear and die out faster than those
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Fall in Impact on
confidence real GDP
One Two Aug.-Oct. if fall in
Current quarter quarter Cumulative (standard confidence
quarter lag lag impact deviations) is sustained
Impact of a one standard deviation fall in the monthly change in business confidence on real GDP
United States
– Conference Board -0.18*** -0.08* -0.07* -0.31 3.2 -1.0
– NAPM -0.10** -0.04 -0.09** -0.23 4.2 -1.0
Japan -0.14* -0.07 -0.06 -0.27 n.a. n.a.
Germany -0.10*** -0.05 -0.05 -0.20 3.7 -0.7
France -0.12*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.15 1.9 -0.3
Italy -0.11** -0.09* -0.02 -0.22 3.0 -0.7
United Kingdom -0.11** -0.08* -0.04* -0.23 0.5 -0.1
Canada -0.05 -0.11* -0.06 -0.22 n.a. n.a.
Impact of a one standard deviation fall in the monthly change in consumer confidence on real GDP
United States
– Conference Board -0.14*** -0.08* -0.15*** -0.37 5.0 -1.9
– Univ. of Michigan -0.09* -0.09* -0.09** -0.27 2.8 -0.8
Table A3.1 Impact of confidence indices on the growth in real GDP
(% of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, December 2001.
Notes: Three asterisks indicate the results are significant at the 1% level, two asterisks at the 5% level, and one asterisk the 10%
level. The coefficients were calculated in such a way that they would be cumulated over time.
analysis, the adjustment of confidence to
permanent stock price changes seems rather
slow and limited.
Several analyses of the impact of consumer
confidence on spending in the United States
and the United Kingdom find that it has some
explanatory power, but the available evidence
for the euro area and business confidence are
rather scarce. Table A3.1 summarises the
results of an analysis undertaken by the staff of
the IMF on the business and consumer
confidence indices. The exercise looked into
the impact of confidence indices on growth in
real GDP for Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom and the United States. The
results suggest that in the United States both
business and consumer confidence indicators
provide useful information about output of the
current and the following two quarters. For the
other countries (except Canada), only the
business confidence series seem to provide
such information. It was also shown that, if the
fall in confidence was sustained, output could
fall by one percentage point in the United
States, 0.7 in Germany and Italy, 0.3 in France
and 0.1 in the United Kingdom. In addition, it
was found that when other variables (stock
price change, interest rate movements, and last
period’s growth) were taken into
consideration, the confidence effect on output
growth was generally reduced.52
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